January 15, 2022
In re Am. River Transp. Co., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1733 (E.D.
LA 2022). The Court denied a defense motion under Daubert v.
Merrdell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 79 (1993), to exclude the
hedonic damages testimony of Dr. Stan V. Smith in boat accidents
resulting in the deaths of three crewmen. Plaintiffs proffered the
hedonic damages testimony of Smith, which defendants argued were not
relevant to damages in a death case. The Court denied the motion
because this was a bench trial and the purpose of Daubert to prevent
unreliable scientific evidence from reaching a jury. The decision
contained no discussion of the nature of or problems with the
reliability of hedonic damages testimony.
April 14, 2022
Stella v. Davis Cnty., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45628 (D. UT
2022). Defendants requested that plaintiffs be barred from
suggesting any specific value for general damages, including pain
and suffering, premature loss of life, and loss of consortium. Judge
Jill N. Parish discussed the fact that general damages are difficult
to calculate by any methodology, citing Smith v. Ingersoll Rand, 214
F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 2000), as follows:
Attempts to quantify the value of human life have met
considerable criticism in the literature of economics as well as
in the federal court system. Troubled by the disparity of results
reached in published value-of-life studies and skeptical of their
underlying methodology, the federal courts which have considered
expert testimony on hedonic damages in the wake of Daubert have
unanimously held quantifications of such damages inadmissible.
Judge Parish did not exclude plaintiffs from providing per diem
damages estimates, but with the added proviso:
[T]o the extent that Plaintiffs intend to suggest a per
diem calculation predicated on a particular life expectancy to the
jury, Plaintiffs must provide that calculation. Defendants are
entitled to conduct discovery related to the foundation for the
life expectancy calculation. Outside of the aforementioned
discovery, the court sees no value to conducting discovery as to
the admittedly arbitrary non-economic damages amount that
Plaintiff's counsel selects to suggest to the jury.
Henkle v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
217367. Defendants challenged the admissibility of projections of
future medical expenses by Roderick Moe, CPA. Moe had used the
mirror image approach, which Judge Donald M. Middlebrooks described
as follows:
In order to determine the present value of Henkle's
future medical expenses, Moe multiplied Henkle's future medical
expenses by a projected percentage increase in costs per year
("growth rate") for six categories of medical [care] to calculate
the growth rate for each category, Moe calculated the average
yearly change in medical costs for that category over the past 24
years. Moe selected the past 24 years as the relevant time frame
for determining changes in medical expenses in order to "reflect
the future 24 years of medical costs," which represent Henkle's
life expectancy.
Judge Middlebrooks pointed out that Moe provided no indication that
his method for determining growth rates by the “mirror image”
approach was generally accepted or defended in any existing
publication, and cited Ollis v. Knecht, 751 N.E. 825 (IN App. 2001),
which had rejected a different economic expert who had also used the
“mirror image” approach.
April 16, 2022
Hunter v. Town of Mocksville, 201 F. Supp. 3d 750 (M.D. NC
2016). This decision involved the wrongful discharge of three police
officers, for whom a decision about front pay was being made by U.S.
District Judge Thomas D. Schroeder. Judge Schroeder provided a list
of factors to be considered when awarding whether to award front pay
and the period of time for which front pay was to be awarded for
each officer. The factors considered were:
• The plaintiff's age
• The length of time the plaintiff was employed
by the defendant employer.
• The likelihood the plaintiff's employment would
have continued absent the discrimination.
• The length of time it will take the plaintiff,
using reasonable effort, to secure comparable employment.
• The plaintiff's work life expectancy.
• The length of time other employees typically
held the position lost.
• The plaintiff's status as an at-will employee.
• The plaintiff's ability to work, including the
ability to work for the defendant employer.
• The plaintiff's subjective intention to remain
in the position.
• The plaintiff's efforts to mitigate damages.
Coterel v. Dorel Juvenile Grp., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
185451 (W.D. MO 2015). The defense had moved to exclude the
testimony of Dr. Kurt V. Krueger based on Krueger’s interpretation
of language in Section § 537.090 of the Missouri Wrongful Death Act
stating that:
If the deceased is under the age of eighteen, there
shall be a rebuttable presumption that the annual pecuniary losses
suffered by reason of the death shall be calculated based on the
annual income of the deceased's parents, provided that if the
deceased has only one parent earning income, then the calculation
shall be based on such income, but if the deceased had two parents
earning income, then the calculation shall be based on the average
of the two incomes.
Krueger interpreted that language to mean that the language created
a separate category for awarding parents of a minor child who was
wrongfully killed such that parents were entitled to an amount equal
to the average earnings of the parents starting immediately and
continuing for the life expectancy of both parents. The defense
economic expert was unnamed, but apparently argued that the parents
had suffered no loss of financial support resulting from the death
of the child. Judge Steven R. Bough denied the motion to
exclude Krueger, allowing both Krueger and the defense expert to
testify based on their respective understandings of the meaning
of § 537.090. The subsequent trial reached a defense verdict
that was appealed to the 8th Circuit and affirmed, but without
reference to how damages should have been calculated.
Eagen v. United States, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40172; 2022 WL 683121
(E.D. MO 2022). Plaintiffs had retained Dr. Kurt V. Krueger as their
expert in this wrongful death claim for the wrongful death of a
minor child. The defense retained Dr. Rebecca Summary. The defense
did not challenge the admissibility of Krueger’s testimony, but
plaintiffs challenged the admissibility of the testimony of Summary.
Judge Shirley Padmore Mensah denied plaintiff’s motion and held
that:
[T]his Court finds that the opinions at issue
here are not at odds with the Missouri wrongful death damages
statute. The statute expressly states that the "presumption that the
annual pecuniary losses suffered by reason of the [minor's] death
shall be calculated based on the annual income of the deceased's
parents" is "rebuttable." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.090. That plain
language does not, in any way, limit the evidence either party may
use to attempt to rebut the presumption, either in an upward or
downward manner.
Warner v. Talos E R T L L C, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31316
(E.D. LA 2022). This case involved the wrongful death of Walter
Jackson, who had a son in a previous marriage, and was now living
with a different wife. Smith had been retained on behalf of the son,
but had treated Jackson, his previous wife, and their son as a
family unit for purposes of calculating the following damages
son: (1) wages and employee benefits, (2) household and family
services, (3) value of life, and (4) society and relationship. In
response to Talos's motion, the plaintiff withdrew the third and
fourth categories, but maintained (1) and (2). It appears that
Smith was retained only on behalf of the son from the previous
marriage and not the decedent’s current wife, but only damages for
the son were being considered. Judge James D. Cain, Jr, pointed out
that the decedent’s only relationship with the son was long distance
telephone calls, and that decedent’s only financial contributions in
support of the son were payments “somewhere” between $200 per month
and $1,000 per month, and limited the loss period to age 18 for the
son. Smith was otherwise allowed to testify about lost wages
and lost family services.
May 2, 2022
Valenzuela v. City of Anaheim, 6 F. 4th 1098 (9th Cir.
2021).This decision concerned whether California’s Wrongful Death
Act was consistent with Section § 1983 of the federal Civil Rights
Act. At issue was whether post-death hedonic damages were required
under Section § 1983. The Court cited the decision in Chaudhry v.
City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2014) in holding that
an award for post-death hedonic damages was required under the
federal Civil Rights Act even though not allowed under California’s
Wrongful Death Act.
Valenzuela v. City of Anaheim, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 8471 (9th
Cir. 2022).This decision concerned whether California’s Wrongful
Death Act was consistent with Section § 1983 of the federal Civil
Rights Act. At issue was a three judge panel’s decisions in this
Valenzuela v. City of Anaheim, 6 F.4th 2098 (2021) and in Craig v.
Petropulos, 856 Fed Appx. 649 (2021) whether post-death
hedonic damages were required under Section § 1983. The 9th Circuit
panel respected the decisions of in Valenzuela and Craig, but said
that an award of post-death hedonic damages was required, but also
saying also that:
Post-death "hedonic" damages awards are speculative,
contravene traditional common law damages principles, contradict
California state law, and where, as here, the awards would have
been $9.6 million and $1.6 million respectively in Valenzuela and
Craig without post-death "hedonic" damages, are not necessary to
satisfy the policy goals of § 1983 under Supreme Court precedent.
For these reasons, our court should have ordered a review of the
two cases by an en banc panel.
Anderson v. Hale, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28281 (W.D. Ok.
2002). This decision excluded the hedonic damages testimony of
Dr. James Horrell, but allowed Horrell to testify about earning
capacity and lost services. Plaintiffs had relied upon the decision
in Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand, 214 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2000) in
arguing that Horrell’s testimony was admissible. The Court
held that Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand was not relevant because that
decision involved issues in New Mexico law that were not relevant in
Oklahoma. The Court said:
In Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand, the district court was
called upon to rule on the admissibility of the proposed expert
testimony of Stan Smith, the reputed father of the theory of
hedonic damages. The district court excluded Smith's testimony
purporting to quantify hedonic damages but did allow Mr. Smith to
testify "about the meaning of hedonic damages." Smith, at 1244. It
is unmistakably clear from the Tenth Circuit's opinion, affirming
the judgment of the district court, that the indispensable
predicate for the admission of Stan Smith's testimony about the
meaning of hedonic damages was that "hedonic damages are
explicitly allowed under New Mexico law . . . ." Id.
This is a revised listing.
Lewis v. City of Chicago, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63709; 2005
WL 8178978 (N.D. IL 2005). The court said:
The individual defendants move to bar or limit Lewis'
expert economist, Stan Smith, from testifying regarding losses
attributable to: (a) lost wages and employee benefits, (b)
replacement services, such as advice, counsel, guidance and
instruction, (c) enjoyment of life, and (d) society or
relationship . . .Lewis concedes the motion with respect to
Smith's opinions about loss of advice, counsel, guidance and
instruction, loss of accompaniment services, loss of value of
life, and loss of society or relationship. . . . Lewis' concession
is not surprising given the number of courts that have excluded
testimony in these categories. See, e.g., Mercado v. Ahmed, 974
F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1992); Ayers v. Robinson, 887 F. Supp. 1049
(N.D. Ill. 1995) Doe v. Tag, Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16356, at
*7-9 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1993); Saia v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D. Mass. 1999). Accordingly, the motion
in limine is granted with respect to Smith's testimony relating to
loss of advice, counsel, guidance and instruction, loss of
accompaniment services, loss of value of life and loss of society
or relationship.
May 19, 2022
Cardenas v. Western Express, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261869
(W.D. OK 2-12-2021). This order was a response to a defense motion
in limine to exclude various calculations of economist Dr. Stan V.
Smith. The court allowed Smith’s calculations regarding lost
earnings, but excluded Smith’s calculations regarding lost
job-related fringe benefits based on Smith having provided no
information regarding whether the plaintiff had fringe benefits in
his employment. Smith’s calculations for lost household services was
limited to evidence of specific household services provided by the
decedent for children the decedent was not living with.
Smith’s loss of Guidance and loss of companionship calculations were
excluded because those elements are part of consortium and not part
of pecuniary damages.
Mize-Kursman v. Marin Community College Dist., 202 Cal. App.
4th 832 (CA App. 2012). The plaintiff had suffered a salary
reduction following whistle blower complaints and had continued to
work at the lower salary for several years. At the time of trial,
she was 65 and four months in age and was projected by economist Dr.
Barry Ben-Zion to work another 3.83 years to age 69.14. Ben-Zion had
calculated both loss of pay and reduction of pension benefits, with
a total loss with a present value of $351,935. The
defense had presented evidence that the plaintiff could have chosen
to retire in lieu of continuing to work, showing that her retirement
amount exceeded her pre-reduction salary. The jury found in favor of
the plaintiff but awarded no damages. The Court of Appeals held that
this was reversible error because available retirement benefits
could not be used to reduce lost earnings. The Court reversed the
decision and remanded for retrial on damages. The case then settled.
Thanks to Barry Ben-Zion for assistance with this description.
June 20, 2022
Roberts v. Tim Dahle Imps., Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98682
(D. UT 6-1- 2022). The Court denied a defense motion to exclude or
limit compensatory and punitive damages on the basis that
calculations of those damages were not provided by the appropriate
deadline. The court held that calculations of noneconomic damages,
including hedonic damages, damages for emotional distress and
punitive damages do not require specific calculations to be
provided. The Court cited Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d
1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 2000) regarding hedonic damages, as follows:
Attempts to quantify the value of human life have met
considerable criticism in the literature of economics as well as
in the federal court system. Troubled by the disparity of results
reached in published value-of-life studies and skeptical of their
underlying methodology, the federal courts which have considered
expert testimony on hedonic damages in the wake of Daubert have
unanimously held quantifications of such damages inadmissible.
The Court added that: “Punitive damages are similarly left to the
discretion of the jury and are not subject to concrete rules or
calculation.”
June 27, 2022
Sullivan v. City of Buena Park, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91684
(C.D. CA 4-11-2022). Federal District Judge Cormac J. Cadrney
excluded the testimony of economic expert Robert Johnson regarding
the value of the decedent, David Sullivan. Johnson’s testimony
would have been that the value of any human life fell within the
range of $3,900,000 to $14,400,000 based on papers by Drs. Ted
Miller and Kip Viscusi. Judge Cadrey commented on the fact that
Johnson’s testimony would apply to any decedent, “from a vagrant
bum, an infant, spouse, or the local version of Dr. Jonas Salk.” It
was also noted that no justification was given for using the two
papers by Miller and Viscusi rather than other studies with other
values.
July 3, 2022
McGee v. Target Corp., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109296 (D. NV
6-17-2022). Federal District Judge Kent J. Dawson denied a defense
motion to exclude the hedonic damages testimony of Stan V. Smith,
saying:
The Nevada Supreme Court has permitted economists to use
various methods to arrive at their conclusions on hedonic loss,
including a "willingness-to-pay method" similar to the one
utilized by Smith in this case. Id. at 62-63. Smith uses his
"willingness-to-pay method" but uses different data and sources to
arrive at his conclusions than the expert in Banks [Banks v.
Sunrise Hospital, 2004]. This difference is properly addressed on
cross-examination. The Court is confident that Smith's testimony
is not substantially more prejudicial than probative and that it
will not confuse the issues or mislead the jury. As stated
previously, Smith's report merely gives the jury a framework with
which to determine a damages amount. Target will have the
opportunity to attack Smith's data and calculations on
cross-examination, but it will be up to the jury to determine the
credibility of the witness and the weight to give his report.
Miller v. Juarez Cartel, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112463 (D.
N.D. 6-24-2022). This was a judicial ruling by Federal Magistrate
Judge Clare R. Hochhalter in an ATA (Anti-Terrorism Act) case
involving deaths and injuries to two American families by the Juarez
Cartel. The defendant was not represented and there was no
expectation that the defendant would pay awarded damages. The case
was bench-tried and expert reports were submitted in writing. Damage
opinions of economic expert Stan V. Smith for one group of
plaintiffs and by J. Matthew Sims for another group of plaintiffs
were reported in the decision. Smith’s opinions included loss
of wages and benefits, loss of household services, loss of guidance
and counsel, loss of accompaniment services, life care services of
one decedent for a family member, value of life of decedents, or
loss of society and relationship. Sim’s damage opinions included
loss of wages and benefits, household services and care for fellow
family members, and cost of vocational rehabilitation for injured
minor children. Sims did not include guidance and counsel, loss of
accompaniment services, value of life, or loss of relationship, but
Judge Hochhalter included amounts based on Smith’s calculations for
the first group of plaintiffs.
Laney v. Vance, 112 So. 3d 1079 (MS 4-25-13). The
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded the trial court
opinion, saying: “Because the trial judge committed reversible error
in instructing the jury that they could consider the "value of life"
of the deceased in awarding damages, and because counsel for Vance
made improper and prejudicial comments to the jury during closing
arguments, we reverse and remand for a new trial.” There is no
indication that an economic expert was involved in this case.
Gurvey v. Twp. of Montclair, N.J., 2022 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 59815 (D. N.J. 3-31-2022). Gurvey’s claim was that police
officers entered his residence and forced him to have an unwanted
psychiatric examination to determine whether Gurvey was suicidal.
Stan Smith valued Gurley’s alleged wages and benefits and Gurvey’s
reduction in value of life caused by this incident. This was part of
a cross-motion for summary judgment that was denied. The judge
denied a defense motion to exclude Smith’s testimony without
prejudice, meaning that the motion in limine could be refiled at a
later stage of the litigation.
July 17, 2022
James v. Antarctic Mech. Servs, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52619
(S.D. MS 2020). Economic expert Dr. George Carter relied upon
earnings projections of vocational expert Kathy Smith, who did not
rely on James’s actual earnings record. The Court stated that loss
of earning capacity in Mississippi must be based at least in part on
a plaintiff’s actual earnings record, if such a record existed. For
that reason and because lost fringe benefit can only be calculated
if there is evidence that a plaintiff is actually using them,
Smith’s testimony was excluded and Carter’s testimony that relied
upon Smith’s opinions on lost earning capacity was also excluded.
Carter was permitted to testify about household services based on
Carter’s assumption that James’s custodial granddaughter would
continue to live with James until age 18.
August 10, 2022
Pepin v. Wisconsin Central, Ltd., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
187909 (W.D. MI 2021). The Court that railroad retirement taxes
should not be excluded when calculating loss of earnings. The court
provided two rationales for not excluding Tier I and Tier II taxes:
(1) That such taxes will be levied on the portion of an award that
is for lost earnings under BNSF v. Loos (U.S. 2019);
and (2) That because Pepin is not claiming a loss of pension
benefits, taxes to finance those benefits should not be excluded.
This decision provides a good review of legal decisions regarding
claims of lost pension benefits and railroad retirement taxes. The
decision also held that statistical evidence of average age of
retirements of railroad workers could be presented to a jury, but
not the availability of retirement benefits if a plaintiff
retired,
September 2, 2022
Stratton v. Thompson/Center Arms, Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
155529 (D. UT 8-25-2022). This decision limited the testimony
of Dr. Paul Thomas and Jacquelyn Vega Valez of Vocational Economics,
Inc., to explaining that disabilities in general can result in
reduced work lives, but could not project a specific reduction for
the plaintiff. Valez testified for the plaintiff at the Daubert
hearing, as did R. Brad Townsend, CPI, a forensic accountant for the
defendant. Federal District Judge David Nuffer was very detailed in
his analysis of the VEI, Inc., methods used by Thomas and Vega, and
cited Nora Ostrofe, “Does the Vocational Economic Rationale Have
Merit?—An Appraisal,” 20 J. Legal Econ. 61, 71 (July 2014). Judge
Nuffer said:
The Vocational Experts' primary deficiency is that they
fail to show that their methods, even if accurate for the general
population, "can reliably predict the future work-life expectancy
of a specific person." Neither the data itself nor its use in the
general sense appear problematic. For example, the general
proposition that persons with disabilities have a diminution in
work-life expectancy compared to persons without disabilities does
not appear to be controversial or even challenged. But the
Vocational Experts' attempt to take that general premise, that
persons with disabilities have a diminished work-life expectancy,
and attempt to apply it to Mr. Stratton's situation, is not based
on a reliable foundation. The Vocational Experts have not
established that the use of their methods in the specific, as
opposed to the general, is reliable or relevant to the situation
at hand.
September 5, 2022
Augustin v. Hyatt Regency of New Orleans, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1061; 1992 WL 21823 (E.D. LA 1992). Economic expert Melville
Wolfson was prohibited from testifying regarding his calculations on
the value of the loss of enjoyment of life.
Pick v. American Medical Sys., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3588;
1997 WL 149985 (E.D. LA 1997). Economic expert Melville
Wolfson was prohibited from testifying about the hedonic damages of
the decedent under Rules 702 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Abadie v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 804 So. 2d 11 (LA App. 2001)
The Court of Appeals held that it was in error for the trial court
to have admitted the hedonic damages testimony of economic expert
Dr. Melville Wolfson, but that the trial court had neutralized that
error and this was not grounds for reversal of the trial court
decision. The Court said:
Defendants objected to any testimony from Dr. Wolfson on
this issue and a Daubert hearing was held. Dr. Wolfson testified
that the method he used to calculate loss of enjoyment of life
assumes earning capacity as a unit of measurement and the value of
leisure time as determined by that earning capacity. He agreed
that the economic testimony had a very limited function, that the
determination rests with the fact finder, and that this was but
one component of the damages. Dr. Wolfson admitted that his
methodology is unique and he has not published any material on the
matter. The trial court first admitted the testimony, and Dr.
Wolfson valued this portion of damages at $ 1,228,565.00. The
court later determined it had committed [Pg 19] error and
instructed the jury to disregard this testimony. We agree with the
statement in Foster v. Trafalgar House Oil & Gas, 603 So. 2d
284, (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1992), that economic theories which
attempt to extrapolate the "value" of human life from various
studies of wages, costs, etc., have no place in the calculation of
general damages. See also Mistich v. Volkswagen of Germany, Inc.
94-0226 (La. App. 4th Cir. 6/25/97), 698 So. 2d 47,wherein the
court determined to reject the testimony of Dr. Wolfson on this
same issue: " Hedonic damages] refers to damages for loss of
enjoyment of life. They are included in the concept of general
damages because, like pain and suffering, they cannot be
quantified with any degree of "pecuniary exactitude" or measured
definitely in terms of money." Id, at 51. We agree that it was
error for the court to permit that testimony.
Myers v. Williams Mfg., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29102 (D. N.M.
2003). This order was partly in response to a defense motions in
limine to exclude the hedonic damages testimony of Dr. Brian
McDonald. Federal District Judge William P. Johnson said:
The parties have not provided the Court with a copy of
Dr. McDonald's report or with the specific testimony that is being
challenged. Dr. McDonald will not be allowed to testify as to "his
valuation that Plaintiff has suffered a loss of $10,000.00 per
year in purely hedonic damages." To that extent, Defendant's
Motion in Limine will be granted. However, the Court is unable to
properly perform its gatekeeping function under Rule 702 without
the expert's report. Therefore, the Court will defer ruling on the
admissibility of the remainder of Dr. McDonald's hedonic damages
testimony until it has had an opportunity to review his report and
consider oral argument of counsel. The Court will then determine
whether Fed. R. Evid. 403 and 703 are appropriate bases for
excluding Dr. McDonald's testimony on hedonic damages.
Judge Johnson also said in a footnote:
Defendant has provided a copy of a report by its own
economist, Dr. George Rhodes, whose opinion is that an economist
"does not bring reliable or valid scientific testimony or
specialized knowledge to a trier of fact with respect to placing
dollar values on human lives or on the enjoyment of value to a
human life or the enjoyment of it with validity or reliability."
Def. Ex. A at 2. Dr. Rhodes attacks certain portions of Dr.
McDonald's report, but without the report the Court cannot assess
adequately the factors it must consider.
Lujan v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
131028 (D. N.M. 2008). The defense moved to exclude the hedonic
damages testimony of Dr. Thomas McKinnon, plaintiff’s economic
expert. U.S. Magistrate Judge Robert Hayes Scott found
Mckinnon unqualified, indicating that McKinnon had no specialized
knowledge or training as an expert on hedonic damages and had never
taken training or classes or studies in value of life issues. In
addition, Judge Scott found that:
[N]othing indicates that Mr. McKinnon's theory is
testable; the studies on which he bases his testimony produce
values ranging from $6.1 million to $12.9 million, suggesting very
broad and flexible parameters. Although Mr. McKinnon purportedly
relies on "published [i.e., peer reviewed] research" regarding the
value of life, theories of hedonic damages attempting "to monetize
that portion of the value of life which is not captured by
measures of economic productivity" are highly controversial. . . .
Neither Mr. McKinnon nor Plaintiff suggests the existence of any
known or potential error rate. The controversy that exists among
economists and others regarding the meaning and use of such
studies does not indicate a general acceptance of such testimony
in the relevant community. Applying these factors leads the Court
to conclude that Mr. McKinnon's proposed testimony is not
reliable. Moreover, this Court is persuaded by the weight of
authority rejecting expert testimony that attempts to quantify
hedonic damages as unreliable, untestable, and failing to meet the
requirement of general acceptability.
Bolden v. Walsh Group, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44351 (N.D. IL
2012). This was a putative class action filed by twelve black
employees. U.S. District Judge Joan Humphrey Lefkow limited the
testimony of Dr. Stan V. Smith regarding his class damages
calculations and excluded Smith’s hedonic damages projections
entirely, saying:
Walsh objects to Smith's calculation of hedonic damages,
which Smith describes as the damages attributable to the class
members' "loss of enjoyment of life" as a result of Walsh's
discriminatory employment practices. His method is based on a
"willingness to pay" model for calculating the value of a life,
which looks at consumer purchases, wage risk premiums, and
regulatory cost-benefit analysis to determine a value that society
places on an individual human life. (Smith Rep't, App'x E at 1.)
Smith concludes that the statistical value of a human life is $4.2
million and estimates that black Walsh employees would sustain a
10 percent loss of enjoyment of life as a result of racial
discrimination. (Id. at 2.) In support, Smith cites an article
that describes a conceptual approach for applying estimates of the
loss of the pleasure in life (referred to as hedonic damages) in
personal injury cases. See Edward P. Berla, Michael L.
Brookshshire & Stan V. Smith, Hedonic Damages and Personal
Injury: A Conceptual Approach, J. of Forensic Economics, Vol. 3,
No. 1, pp. 1-8 (1990). As Smith admitted in his deposition,
however, he is aware of no studies that apply hedonic damages in
the context of a hostile work environment or otherwise
discriminatory environment. (Smith Dep. at 173-74.) His estimate
of a 10 percent loss in enjoyment of life is an assumption that is
not subject to any scientific testing, and the estimate may vary
depending upon the fact-finder's determination of individualized
damages. (Id.; Smith Rebuttal Rep't at 18-19.) Plaintiffs have
cited no case or peer-reviewed article where hedonic damages were
used to determine the "loss of enjoyment of life" that results
from employment discrimination. Smith's calculation of hedonic
damages will be excluded.
September 22, 2022
Taylor v. United States, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166301 (D. NM
2022). In a wrongful death action, the testimony of Dr. M. Brian
McDonald was limited as follows:
Dr. McDonald will not be permitted to opine or otherwise
testify at trial as to the numerical quantification or computation
of hedonic damages, including any "benchmark" figure corresponding
to the value of life. Dr. McDonald may testify about other aspects
of hedonic damages, including its definition and a general
explanation of the components of an individual's life that the
Court may consider in deciding whether to award hedonic damages.
From a footnote, “a benchmark figure for the value of life refers to
testimony on the value of a statistical life (as opposed to the
economic value of the decedent's life).”
October 7, 2022
Lemperle v. Avis Rent-a-Car Sys. 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265288
(D. NV 2020). U.S. District Judge James C. Mahan denied a
defense motion to exclude the testimony of economic expert Stan V.
Smith regarding loss of earnings, loss of household services, cost
of future life care and hedonic damages. Defendants were free to
challenge Dr. Smith’s calculations in any of these areas. Regarding
hedonic damages, Judge Mahan said:
[W]ithout Dr. Smith's testimony—and the aggregated
economic data that underlies it—the jury's award of hedonic
damages would likely be arbitrary. While economists have come to
different conclusions regarding the value to ascribe to a human
life using "risk reduction" or "willingness to pay" methodology,
this paradigm is widely used by economists to determine monetary
values associated with everyday risks. Thus, Dr. Smith's
specialized and technical expertise is helpful to the jury when
determining the monetary value of plaintiff's hedonic damages.
November 27, 2022
Williams v. B&B Elec. & Util. Contrs., Inc., 2022
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186277 (S.D. TX 2-08-2022). Plaintiffs
profferred the testimony of Dr. Gary Kronrad, an economic expert,
regarding pain and suffering based on a per diem unity of time
during which pain and suffering was projected to occur. The exact
per diem amount is not identified in the decision. The Court
held that per diem testimony of this type can be presented by an
attorney in closing arguments, but not by an expert with imprimatur
of expert testimony. The Court said:
Because the issue is not a matter of special training or
expertise, but rather it involves elementary multiplication, Dr.
Kronrad's testimony is not truly expert testimony and will not
properly assist the jury. It is neither a relevant nor reliable
opinion on the amount of damages, for which it is offered.
Consequently, the Court EXCLUDES the testimony.
United States v. Boam, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158842 (D. ID
8-31-2022). This case involved restitution for injury to a child
through being used for child pornography. Economic expert Stan V.
Smith offered testimony about (1) loss of wages and employee
benefits; (2) the cost of future life care; (3) reduction in the
value of life. Based on Smith’s report, the Court ordered $320,548
in cost of life care and $2,006,113 in lost earnings. However,
the government did not ask for reduction in the value of life as
part of its claim for restitution.
Stovall v. Mack Truck’s, Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192488
(10-21-2022). Mack filed a motion in limine to exclude Dr. Ralph
Scott as an expert witness in this case. Mack seeks to exclude Dr.
Scott's opinion testimony on the value of statistical life ("VSL")
as being unreliable and irrelevant. The Court said:
The Court joins with other courts in this district in
finding that the VSL testimony is inadmissible. . . . To the
extent that Stovall is offering Dr. Scott's testimony on the value
of a statistical life methodology, the motion is granted. If Dr.
Scott has given any opinions not relying on VSL, he will be
permitted to testify.