



## Introduction: Towards a Global History of Modernization

We seem to be living modernization twice, the first time as earnestness, the second time as irony.

—Frederick Cooper<sup>1</sup>

The ironic tone of historians of modernization theory in the 1990s, as Africanist Frederick Cooper suggests, inverted the earnestness of the modernizers themselves. Economist and impresario Walt Whitman Rostow remains, much as he would have liked, a larger-than-life symbol of modernization programs. He fit the earnest believer role perfectly, promoting economic modernization as the cure to all ills in the newly named third world. Western capital and technical know-how, in this simplified model, would provide all countries with the chance to achieve the same prosperity and political freedoms that he identified with the United States. The vision was boldly and blithely universal: every nation, however poor, could become like the United States—and it was the job of Americans to make that happen. As Rostow famously quoted his poet namesake:

One thought ever at the fore  
That in the Divine Ship, the World, breasting Time and Space,  
All peoples of the globe sail together, sail the same voyage, are bound to the  
same destination.<sup>2</sup>

The scholarship on modernization theory and development aid that came out of the 1990s took, as Cooper rightly suggests, an ironic tone.<sup>3</sup> It relished the large gap between aspiration and achievement, between lofty goals of world prosperity and grinding poverty that worsened, in many cases, through the 1960s and 1970s. The 1960s, which the Kennedy administration declared the

1. Frederick Cooper, "Modernity," in Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley, CA, 2005), 148.

2. Walt Whitman, "One Thought Ever at the Fore" (1891), in *Complete Poems*, ed. Francis Murphy (London, 1975), 558—quoted in Max F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow, *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy* (New York, 1958), 151.

3. By way of definition, the articles in this symposium deal with historical efforts to induce overall modernization with economic change being the primary lever for creating a modern society, culture, and polity. These articles take an ecumenical view of modernization as an intellectual agenda and set of policies and practices. They try to avoid replicating the protagonists' perspective uncritically; instead, they aim to historicize modernization policies and programs and to contextualize them in their larger mental and structural frameworks.

“Development Decade,” instead became the decade in which development programs and the technocratic optimism that motivated them, ran aground, dashing hopes and undermining the belief in the universal potential of modern, rational methods of socioeconomic progress. Accounts by Arturo Escobar, Wolfgang Sachs, and others emphasized the ways in which modernization functioned much like F. Scott Fitzgerald’s green light: it might define a historical narrative, but it could not be achieved.<sup>4</sup> The promises of modernization were, in this telling, impossible, even unreal, goals because modernization could not be imposed or invited; efforts to do so were doomed to fail.

Cooper may have missed, among diplomatic historians, another stage of the return of modernization: cynicism. Drawing on some of the *dependencia* theories of the 1970s, cynics dismissed the seriousness with which development workers thought they were being altruistic and could help to improve peacefully and constructively not only local living conditions, but also make the world a safer and more prosperous place. Instead, critics have emphasized the other, ostensibly real functions of modernization: to win the newly independent nations for the “free world” while at the same time securing unfettered access to their considerable natural resources and using the decolonized regions as a social scientific laboratory without having to bear responsibility for their experiments’ effects.<sup>5</sup> Modernization programs were at best plays for geopolitical loyalty, ploys to help the American economy, or playing fields for academics eager to try out their theoretical models in practice.<sup>6</sup>

Perhaps we have passed through earnestness, irony, and cynicism to a new stage: modernization as history—make that global history. Nick Cullather announced in these pages that development had become “history” back in 2000, but that history could at times be quite circumscribed.<sup>7</sup> It tended to be American-centered, saw modernization as a counterweight to superpower conflict, and focused on broad-brush programs rather than specifics. A global history of modernization transcends those limits: it explores modernization not

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4. Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, NJ, 1995); Wolfgang Sachs, ed., *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power* (London, 1992).

5. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London, 1972); Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil* (New York, 1967).

6. Roland Popp, “An Application of Modernization Theory during the Cold War? The Case of Pahlavi Iran,” *International History Review* 3, no. 1 (2008): 76–98; Mark T. Berger, “The Rise and Demise of Postwar Development and the Origins of Post-Cold War Capitalism,” *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 30, no. 2 (June 2001), 211–34; Ron Robin, *The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Intellectual Complex* (Princeton, NJ, 2001); Mark Solovey, “Project Camelot and the 1960s Epistemological Revolution: Rethinking the Politics-Patronage-Social Science Nexus,” *Social Studies of Science* 31, no. 2 (2001): 171–206; Narayan Khadka, “U.S. Aid to Nepal in the Cold War Period: Lessons for the Future,” *Pacific Affairs* 73, no. 1 (2000): 77–95; Dustin M. Wax, ed., *Anthropology at the Dawn of the Cold War: The Influence of Foundations, McCarthyism, and the CIA* (London, 2008).

7. Nick Cullather, “Development? It’s History,” *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 4 (2000): 641–53.

as an American export, but as a global phenomenon that was hotly contested, between blocs but also within them; it examines the intersections between modernization and geopolitics, considering them analytically distinct but often overlapping; and it starts from the assumption that modernization was a global project in character and scope. Global here also implies transnational: modernization policies transcended national and regional borders, transferred knowledge across continents and established connections between societies and individuals that might not have come into existence otherwise. Finally, global histories of modernization must be written from the local—about specific projects and individuals. It is counterintuitive to suggest that the best way to understand a global process is by narrowing the focus, but as the following articles suggest, local studies offer an excellent avenue to the study of global studies of modernization without losing sight of regional, national, and international circumstances.

Previous scholarship set out some of the broad-brush parameters that make local studies possible. Thanks to pioneering works by Robert Packenham (begun in the late 1960s, when modernization still had many adherents) and more recently by Michael Latham, Nils Gilman, Amy Staples, and dozens of others, we have a clear sense of what modernization was. Gilman, like Packenham but with archival materials and a keener eye for institutions, plumbed the unspoken assumptions and the visible institutions that put it at the forefront of American social science in the postwar decades.<sup>8</sup> Latham showed how the ideas of modernization made their way into the key elements of American policy towards the third world.<sup>9</sup> Staples illuminated the perspective of development experts working in the world of intergovernmental agencies.<sup>10</sup> Yet these works, for all of their power, imply that ideas about modernization emanate from the West to the rest; and they take place, by and large, above the level of the specific encounter between “modernizers” and their subjects (or is it their objects?).

To the extent that this encounter has been the subject of scholarly analysis, it is usually at the hands of anthropologists or ethnographically inclined social scientists: Timothy Mitchell, Tania Li, Akhil Gupta, and especially James Ferguson.<sup>11</sup> These anthropological accounts have wielded their influence outside their field, as historians investigated development highly attuned to the

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8. Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science* (Princeton, NJ, 1973); Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore, 2003).

9. Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000).

10. Amy L. S. Staples, *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965* (Kent, OH, 2006).

11. Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity* (Berkeley, CA, 2002); Tania M. Li, *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics* (Durham, NC, 2007); Akhil Gupta, *Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India* (Durham, NC, 1998); James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Cambridge, England, 1990).

assumptions that each actor brings to the encounter, as well as the formal and informal structures of knowledge and power involved. As this last phrase suggests, the anthropological accounts are also the ones most likely to attempt discourse analysis along the lines suggested by Michel Foucault.

One of the hallmarks of a new global history of modernization is the willingness to look beyond the United States; for all of its power in the Cold War, it was not everywhere and at every moment the most important part of the “battle for the hearts and minds” of the third world. In dividing the late twentieth-century world along the North-South axis rather than the East-West one, scholars are examining modernization as a project that engaged not just the United States, but the whole northern hemisphere. Western European programs have received the most attention. As the European empires dissolved—whether the result of war, insurgency, or geopolitical machinations—the European metropolises maintained special relationships with their former colonies: conflicted, even antagonistic, but special nonetheless. West Germany presented a special case as it sought to export its *Wirtschaftswunder* to the third world in the late 1950s and early 1960s.<sup>12</sup> The principal English-language scholarship on West European aid has been focused on outlining the institutions and forms of aid at a macro level.<sup>13</sup> This important task now completed, historians of Europe have been delving more deeply into the history of the development and modernization programs.<sup>14</sup> They are writing not just the history of colonialism and decolonization or the history of the superpower antagonism, but the ways in which these two landmark processes of the twentieth century coincided and intersected. The legacies of colonialism—recently analyzed under the paradigm of transnational history—have started to gain more attention in recent years, reminding historians of Europe of the existence of relationships and

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12. Christian Jetzlsperger, “Die Emanzipation der Entwicklungspolitik von der Hallstein-Doktrin: Die Krise der deutschen Nahostpolitik von 1965, die Entwicklungspolitik und der Ost-West-Konflikt,” *Historisches Jahrbuch* 121 (2001): 320–66; Heide-Irene Schmidt, “Pushed to the Front: The Foreign Assistance Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1958–1971,” *Journal of Contemporary European History* 12, no. 4 (2003): 473–507; Hendrik Grote, “Von der Entwicklungshilfe zur Entwicklungspolitik: Voraussetzungen, Strukturen und Mentalitäten der bundesdeutschen Entwicklungshilfe 1949–1961,” *Vorgänge* 43, no. 2 (2004): 24–35; Andreas Eckert, “Exportschlagler Wohlfahrtsstaat? Europäische Sozialstaatlichkeit und Kolonialismus in Afrika nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 32, no. 4 (2006): 467–88.

13. *Contemporary European History* 12, no. 4 (2003)—especially Gérard Bossuat on France, Esther Helena Arens on the Netherlands, and Jim Tomlinson on the United Kingdom.

14. Marc Frey, “Control, Legitimacy, and the Securing of Interests: European Development Policy in South-East Asia from the Late Colonial Period to the Early 1960s,” *Contemporary European History* 12, no. 4 (2003): 395–412; Stephan Malinowski, “Modernisierungskriege? Militärische Gewalt und koloniale Modernisierung am Beispiel des Algerienkrieges (1954–1962),” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 48 (2008): 213–48; Corinna R. Unger, “Rourkela, ein ‘Stahlwerk im Dschungel’: Industrialisierung, Modernisierung und Entwicklungshilfe im Kontext von Dekolonisation und Kaltem Krieg (1950–1970),” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 48 (2008): 367–88.

interdependencies with the non-European world that had been forgotten in the wake of World War II and the tumultuous postwar period.<sup>15</sup>

Scholarship on Eastern Europe has lagged behind, but is slowly catching up. Especially after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, east bloc nations established programs all over the third world; the so-called “Soviet economic offensive” sought to capitalize on anticolonialism and anticapitalism in the third world; across Eastern Europe, but especially in East Germany, aid programs proliferated.<sup>16</sup> Each program came with its own baggage. For East Germany, aid hindered West German diplomacy (whose Hallstein Doctrine prohibited diplomatic ties with any country recognizing the German Democratic Republic) as much as it helped recipients’ economies.<sup>17</sup> Largely missing from the picture is the aid provided by the Soviet Union itself. A welter of contemporaneous works explored aid as a form of alliance-building or entrapment, but there is, as yet, little about development programs themselves.<sup>18</sup> A handful of scholars have expanded the study of the Soviet Union and the world beyond the emphasis on military aid and Cold War crises, but only rarely have development programs come under discussion.<sup>19</sup> Before turning to local studies, then, some of the basic

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15. See Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, eds., *Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1871–1914* (Göttingen, Germany, 2004). For recent research on Germany’s colonial legacies, see Andreas Eckert and Albert Wirtz, “Wir nicht, die Anderen auch: Deutschland und der Kolonialismus,” in *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus: Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria (Frankfurt am Main, Germany, 2002), 372–92; Dirk van Laak, *Imperiale Infrastruktur: Deutsche Planungen für eine Erschließung Afrikas 1880 bis 1960* (Paderborn, Germany, 2004); Boris Barth and Jürgen Osterhammel, eds., *Zivilisierungsmissionen: Imperiale Weltverbesserung seit dem 18. Jahrhundert* (Konstanz, Germany, 2005).

16. Martin Rudner, “East European Aid to Asian Developing Countries: The Legacy of the Communist Era,” *Modern Asian Studies* 30, no. 1 (1996): 1–28; Gregory R. Witkowski, “Spenden für die Dritte Welt zwischen kirchlichen und politischen Interessen in der DDR,” in *Stifter, Spender, und Mäzene: USA und Deutschland im historischen Vergleich*, ed. Thomas Adams, Gabriele Lingelbach, and Simone Lässig (Stuttgart, Germany, 2009 in press); Hubertus Büschel, “In Afrika helfen: Akteure westdeutscher ‘Entwicklungshilfe’ und ostdeutscher ‘Solidarität’ 1955–1975,” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 48 (2008): 333–65.

17. Jude Howell, “The End of an Era: The Rise and Fall of G.D.R. Aid,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 32, no. 2 (1994): 305–28; Young-Sun Hong, “‘The Science of Health Must Spread Among All’: International Solidarity and the Socialist New Man in the Era of Decolonization,” in *Socialist Modern: East German Everyday Culture and Politics*, ed. Paul Betts and Katherine Pence (Ann Arbor, MI, 2008), 183–210; Hans-Joachim Spanger and L. Brock, *Die beiden deutschen Staaten in der Dritten Welt: Die Entwicklungspolitik der DDR, eine Herausforderung für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Opladen, Germany, 1987); Sara Lorenzini, *Due Germanie in Africa: La cooperazione allo sviluppo e la competizione per i mercati di materie prime e tecnologia* (Firenze, Italy, 2003).

18. Andrzej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama, eds., *The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades* (Ithaca, NY, 1987); Roger Kanet, ed., *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations* (Baltimore, MD, 1974); Marshall Goldman, *Soviet Economic Aid*; Joseph S. Berliner, *Soviet Economic Aid: The New Aid Trade Policy in Underdeveloped Countries* (New York, 1958); Andreas Hilger, “Revolutionsideologie, Systemkonkurrenz oder Entwicklungspolitik? Sowjetisch-indische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in Chruschtschows Kaltem Krieg,” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 48 (2008): 389–410.

19. Julie Hessler, “Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics and the Cold War,” *Cahiers du monde russe* 47:1–2 (July 2006): 33–64; Constantin Katsakioris, “L’Union

parameters of aid programs need to be well documented. The same applies for studies on Japan and the so-called Asian tigers; English publications on these nations have focused on Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea as objects of modernization—recipients rather than donors.<sup>20</sup>

By narrowing its scope to a single country and often a single project, works in this new global history of modernization are best able to include the principal actors in a given moment. With this comes scholarship that uses multiple archives and, more importantly, multiple perspectives. Jeffrey James Byrne's article on Algeria in the 1960s, for instance, follows French, American, and Soviet officials as they pursue national goals in Algeria—as well as how factions within Algeria sought their own aims in each relationship. Similarly, Massimiliano Trentin's article follows Syrian policymakers, as well as those from the two Germanies, as they pursued their nation's goals in the complicated interactions between them. And Bradley Simpson's analysis of modernization programs in Indonesia looks from the archipelago northward to the Cold War superpowers, rather than from Washington south.

At the same time, explorations of the local ensure careful analysis of specific projects and practices. Historians thus far know much more about modernization as an intellectual framework than about modernization on the ground: what actual programs operated in the name of modernization? What impacts did these programs have on the countries involved—donor as well as recipient? And how did these experiences shape the ideas from which they emerged? This last item in particular allows us to more fully consider modernization as a dynamic enterprise, not a single unchanging set of ideas but a determined effort to improve the third world (“improve” of course being a loaded term) and understand how social change happens and how to make it happen.

The new scholarship on modernization as a global project also denaturalizes the nation. Thomas Bender declared one of the main tasks of a transnational American history was to decenter the nation—not to eliminate it as a category of historical analysis, but to contextualize it and interrogate it.<sup>21</sup> The same

soviétique et les intellectuels Africains: Internationalisme, panafricanisme et negritude pendant les années de la décolonisation, 1955–1964,” *Cahiers du monde russe* 47:1–2 (July 2006), 15–32; Katsakioris, “Transferts est-sud: Echanges éducatifs et formation de cadres africains en Union soviétique pendant les années soixante,” *Outre-Mers. Revue d'histoire* 1 (January–June 2007), 83–106. Ragna Boden, *Die Grenzen der Weltmacht: Sowjetische Indonesienpolitik von Stalin bis Brežnev* (Stuttgart, 2006); Maxim Matusевич, *No Easy Row for the Russian Hoe: Ideology and Pragmatism in Nigerian-Soviet Relations, 1960–1991* (Trenton, NJ, 2003).

20. Victor Koschmann, “Modernization and Democratic Values: The ‘Japanese Model’ in the 1960s,” in *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War*, ed. David C. Engerman et al. (Amherst, MA, 2003), 225–49 and Gregg Andrew Brazinsky, “Koreanizing Modernization: Modernization Theory and South Korean Intellectuals,” in *Staging Growth*, 251–73; Nick Cullather, “Fuel for the Good Dragon: The United States and Industrial Policy in Taiwan,” *Diplomatic History* 20, no. 1 (1996), 1–26; Pradip K. Gosh, *Developing South Asia: A Modernization Perspective* (Westport, CT, 1984).

21. Thomas Bender, “Historians, the Nation, and the Plenitude of Narratives,” in *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley, CA, 2002).

dictum applies to the new histories of modernization. International organs played an important role in shaping both the theories and practices of modernization. Global institutions founded in the 1940s—World Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and World Health Organization (WHO), for instance—took a leading role.<sup>22</sup> Thus Daniel Maul's article about the International Labor Organization gives some indication of the role of intergovernmental agencies—and one not typically associated with development programs. Regional organizations like the European Development Fund (EDF) also became important features of the global development landscape.<sup>23</sup> American philanthropies—especially the Ford and Rockefeller foundations and the Carnegie Corporation—played an especially important role.<sup>24</sup> As Matthew Connelly argued *vis-à-vis* population control, these organizations were part of an extraordinary network that also encompassed third world elites, national states, and intergovernmental agencies.<sup>25</sup> Contextualizing the nation furthermore entails taking full account of the internal divisions within it—geographical as well as physical. Daniel Speich accomplishes this by showing how differences in visions of modernization within Kenya shaped differences in political affiliation and eventually Kenyan politics. Looking below the national level, as well as above it, does not deny the existence or power of nations and states, but allows a deeper understanding of personal and institutional networks of knowledge that encompassed but were not limited to sovereign states.

The new global histories of modernization, furthermore, examine the relationship between ideas and actions. This relationship, much beloved by Rostow himself, has long been central to modernization, which was an intellectual agenda as much as it was a set of aid programs.<sup>26</sup> Historians writing about the Cold War university have recently drawn attention to the tight connections between scholars and policy.<sup>27</sup> These connections were nowhere closer than in

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22. Staples, *The Birth of Development*; Richard Jolly, *UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice* (Bloomington, IN, 2004).

23. See Schmidt, "Pushed to the Front," 478–80; John White, "German Aid to Developing Countries." *International Affairs* 41, no. 1 (1965): 74–88.

24. Edward Berman, *The Ideology of Philanthropy: The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy* (Albany, NY, 1983); Landrum R. Bolling with Craig Smith, *Private Foreign Aid: U.S. Philanthropy for Relief and Development* (Boulder, CO, 1982); Gary R. Hess, "Waging the Cold War in the Third World: The Foundations and the Challenges of Development," in *Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History*, ed. Lawrence J. Friedman and Mark D. McGarvie (Cambridge, England, 2003), 319–39; Corinna R. Unger, "Investing in Modernity: Amerikanische Stiftungen in der Dritten Welt seit 1945," in *Stifter, Spender, und Mäzene*.

25. Matthew Connelly, "Seeing beyond the State: The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty," *Past and Present* 193 (2006): 197–233.

26. Walt Rostow, for instance, published a number of works under the rubric of the "Ideas and Action" series at the University of Texas Press.

27. Christopher Simpson, ed., *Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences during the Cold War* (New York, 1998); Noam Chomsky et al., *The Cold War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years* (New York, 1997); Joel Isaac, "The Human Sciences in Cold War America," *Historical Journal* 50 (2007): 725–46.

the world of development and modernization, where international fieldwork and government advising were common activities for scholars.<sup>28</sup> Jason Pribilsky's article on the Cornell-Peru Project in Vicos shows how scholars saw the third world as a laboratory for modernization; the process would benefit not only those living in newly modern societies, but also the scholars who studied them. The ideas that were most central to shaping development were designed and presented as neutral and technical measures, but usually amounted to much more. Pursuing economic growth meant raising the gross national product, a measure that in turn shaped development programs.<sup>29</sup>

These six articles, of course, hardly exhaust the possibilities for a new global history of modernization; indeed, they hardly introduce all of the innovations currently under way. All six of these articles, along with ten others, were first presented at a March 2008 workshop sponsored by the German Historical Institute in Washington.<sup>30</sup> At least four innovations necessary for a fuller history of "Modernization as a Global Project" that emerged at that workshop are not fully accounted for in these articles. First is the expansion of chronological boundaries, taking the history out of the 1950s and early 1960s, which marked the peak of American hopes for and commitments to modernizing the third world. Indeed, this chronological focus makes sense only for American aid programs; European programs—in both east and west—expanded primarily in the 1960s. And perhaps it does not even work well for American programs; David Ekbladh has identified parallels between the Tennessee Valley Authority of the 1930s and American modernization programs in the Cold War.<sup>31</sup> But the links between European colonial personnel and programs and infrastructure—Speich, for instance, mentions the British Million Acre Plan for East Africa only in passing—require much fuller investigation.<sup>32</sup> By the same token, historians need to extend their studies of development past the optimism that lasted

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28. Packenham, *Liberal America*; Irene L. Gendzier, *Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World* (Boulder, CO, 1985); David C. Engerman, "American Knowledge and Global Power," *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 4 (September 2007), 599–622.

29. Engerman, "American Knowledge," 599–622; Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York 1999); Jolly, *UN Contributions*.

30. Other participants included Ragna Boden (University of Bochum), David E. Hamilton (University of Kentucky), Joseph M. Hodge (West Virginia University), Young-sun Hong (SUNY Stony Brook), Constantin Katsakioris (Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales), Sara Lorenzini (University of Trento), Lorenz M. Luthi (McGill University), Joy Rohde (American Academy of Arts and Sciences), Bernd Schaefer (Woodrow Wilson International Center), Perrin Selcer (University of Pennsylvania), Bradley R. Simpson (University of Maryland), and James P. Woodard (Montclair State University). See the conference report at <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=2083>.

31. David Ekbladh, "Mr. TVA: Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and the Rise and Fall of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 1933–1973," *Diplomatic History* 26, no. 3 (2002): 335–74.

32. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, "Introduction," in *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, ed. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (Berkeley, CA, 1997), 1–41; Joseph M. Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Athens, OH, 2007).



through the early 1960s and study the problems that modernization faced, both as an intellectual agenda and a set of policies and practices. While archival materials on modernization from the 1970s and beyond do not abound, there are sufficient resources to explore the demise—and not just rise—of modernization.

Secondly, historians have for too long imitated the modernizers' obsessions with heavy industry—and especially steel production—as the mark of modern society. Programs for agriculture and rural modernization, though, were just as important to many modernizers, and debatably had a broader impact. As Nick Cullather's articles have shown so well, the Green Revolution was in large part a development effort—to solve problems of hunger by transforming rural economies and societies throughout the third world.<sup>33</sup> Rostow himself hoped that rural development would be the route to thoroughgoing modernization—and a way to distinguish American programs from Soviet ones. "Marx was a city boy," Rostow wrote in one of his favorite articles, whereas Americans understood that the path to modernity ran through the countryside.<sup>34</sup> The short- and long-term consequences modernization projects had on the environment were mostly ignored or exculpated in the name of progress. Historians will have to pay more attention to the environmental impacts and to their meaning for the rural populations. Hydroelectric dams, artificial fertilizers, roads, monocultures—all these changed the "traditional" ways of living in often unforeseen ways, both with and without links to Cold War geostrategic interests.<sup>35</sup>

Thirdly, we will have to take into account the importance of gender, which has all too long been ignored—not only by the modernizers but also by historians of modernization.<sup>36</sup> The assumption that modernization was a universal process that "made men modern" really was based on a simplified notion of "man." With exception of a few cases in which women were considered "target groups" of modernization by (post)colonial modernizers<sup>37</sup>, women received minimal attention, as did gender structures in general. Only in the late 1960s did Western development experts implement programs that sought to integrate women in the process of development without reducing them to instruments of

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33. Nick Cullather, "The Foreign Policy of the Calorie," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 2 (2007): 337–64; Nick Cullather, "Miracles of Modernization: The Green Revolution and the Apotheosis of Technology," *Diplomatic History* 28, no. 2 (2004): 227–54. Also John H. Perkins, *Geopolitics and Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes and the Cold War* (Oxford, 1997).

34. Walt Rostow, "Marx Was a City Boy, or Why Communism May Fail," *Harper's Magazine* 210 (February 1955), 25–30.

35. See the essays in *Environmental Histories of the Cold War*, ed. John R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger (New York: 2009 forthcoming).

36. Among the exceptions is Christina Klein, "Musicals and Modernization: Rodgers and Hammerstein's *The King and I*," in *Staging Growth*, 129–62.

37. See Malinowski, "Modernisierungskriege," 229–35. Malinowski portrays French programs in Algeria to reach Muslim women through "female" modernization campaigns in an effort to "stabilize" the colony.

nation-building and political stability. Women were now recognized as being their families' principal wage earners, as those taking responsibility for hygiene and birth control, and as that segment of society that was most adept to create grassroots institutions to further self-help.<sup>38</sup> Overcoming the gender blindness of modernizers and modernizing institutions in the South and the North is a central task of future research.

Finally, a global history of modernization will account more fully for religion. While the most energetic of the modernizers saw religion as merely one component of "tradition" that needed to be overcome, others explored the relationship of religion and economic change. The goal was not to produce a new Weber thesis but to understand the complex role that religious belief played in shaping the economics and politics of modernization in the third world. Here, again, anthropologists' attention to local cultures and contexts will be important. Back when anthropologist Clifford Geertz was a mere scholar, not an academic icon, he wrote widely on religion; alongside his well-known article "Ideology as a Cultural System" was a parallel article on religion, the subject of his second book.<sup>39</sup> And before that, Geertz was a modernization theorist, dispatched by adviser Talcott Parsons, the incomprehensible sage of modernization theory, to explore the relationship between modernization and social change in Indonesia.<sup>40</sup> The relationship of Islam to modernization projects, which especially interested Geertz, appears as a sub-theme in Byrne's essay and is of obvious relevance today—especially in a comparative perspective that examines religious beliefs and institutions in a multiconfessional and multinational framework.

We are still at the beginning of the study of modernization as global history. The following essays represent some of the many ways to proceed; they are each once local and global, multilingual and multiperspectival. Taken together, they enrich our understanding of the relations between North and South that shaped the East-West conflict of the late twentieth century—and much else besides, including the self-perception of societies whose representatives sought to

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38. See, for example, Radhika Ramasubban and Bhanwar Singh Rishyasinga, *Sexuality and Reproductive Health and Rights: Fifty Years of the Ford Foundation in India* (New Delhi, 2002); Kathleen McCarthy, "From Government to Grassroots Reform: The Ford Foundation's Population Programs in South Asia, 1959–1981," in *Philanthropy and Cultural Context: Western Philanthropy in South, East, and Southeast Asia in the 20th Century*, ed. Soma Hewa and Philo Hove (Lanham, MD, 1997), 129–56; Ester Boserup, *Woman's Role in Economic Development* (New York, 1970).

39. Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System" (1966), in *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York, 1973); Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (New Haven, CT, 1968).

40. Nils Gilman, "Involution and Modernization: The Case of Clifford Geertz," in *Economic Development: An Anthropological Approach*, ed. Jeffrey Cohen and Norbert Dannhaeuser (Walnut Creek, CA, 2002); Clifford Geertz, *Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia* (Berkeley, CA, 1963); Clifford Geertz, *After the Fact: Two Countries, Four Decades, One Anthropologist* (Cambridge, MA, 1995), chap. 5.

project their own ideals of modernity onto the “less developed” societies. Walt Rostow’s famous five stages of modernization ended with the “age of high mass consumption.” We anticipate no such end of histories of modernization and look forward to seeing how these young scholars, and those who follow them, both broaden and deepen our understanding of the twentieth century—and our own time.