Notes from Chapter 17: Society and Technological Change

The ideas and examples referenced below are notes compiled by Robert Keel from his reading of Volti, Rudi. 2014. Society and Technological Change. 7th edition. New York, NY: Worth Publishers. They are intended for classroom use.

How New Weapons Emerge and How they May be Contained

Core questions:

• In our lifetime, why have new weapons developed at such a frightening rate?
• Why have some weapons been adopted while others have languished?
• How have social and cultural conditions stimulated the development and use of some weapons but not others?

• As humans, we develop new weapons to gain the upper hand against our enemies.
• We act, others react, we react to their actions….
• This pattern is constant throughout history:
  • Knight à longbow
  • Castle à cannons
  • Machine gun à armored tanks
  • Tanksà precision-guided weapons
• Weapons are used for offensive and defensive positions--even if weapon development is for protection:
  • "The best defense is a good offense."
  • Same weapons used for both
  • Antiballistic missile system would allow for first-strike capability.
  • Arms race.

Social Structures and the Development of Military Technologies

• Weapons are not developed and put into service simply because of their intrinsic superiority.
• Social, cultural, and individual motivations influence the emergence of new weaponry.
• "A new device merely opens a door; it does not compel one to enter." White, Lynn. 1978. Medieval Technology and Social Change. New York: Oxford University Press. Page 28)
• Military technology is part of a larger system of values and beliefs: New weapons are necessarily better.
• The longbow à replaced by firearms, BUT--
  1. Initially, the longbow was as effective as musket, if not more effective.
  2. Arrow could penetrate armor as easily as bullet.
  3. Longbow not affected by rain like the musket.
  4. Longbow would not misfire.
  5. BUT, for longbow to be effective, one had to be a skilled bowman (though not all desired to be one).
  6. Rifles required far less skill, did not have to be a master archer (power establishment did not necessarily want all to be so skilled).
  7. Rifles more terrifying…BANG!…than the silent arrowà gave feeling of power.
  8. Guns are also symbol of male virility and potency (psychological impact).
  9. When military technology fits into the existing mode of operation it is very likely to be embraced.
  10. Firearms relevant here--even practice cost money, discipline and obedience emphasized (supported power hierarchy, too).
  11. March in formation and shoot.
• Germany, unlike England, embraced the machine gun.
  • Germany lacked professional army like England and enlisted unskilled men for battle (mercenaries, too).
  • Frederick the Great (feared his own officers). Highly centralized. bureaucratic state.
  • Machine gun required less skill and thus became favored because of the practical concern with training unskilled troops
  • Firepower of gun made up for deficiency in troops
  • Germany, in WWI, became a terrifying foe because of machine gun
  • France and England were slow to realize how war was transformed by the machine gun. The USA, too, even though the Gatling gun and the Maxim gun were invented in the USA.
    • Treated the heavy guns as if they were artillery--failed to develop practical strategies for use.
    • They suffered greatly in battle because of their resistance to change.
    • Stupidity, short-sightedness, and misperceptions shape military technology's development, too.
• However, the success of the machine gun did lead to the development of the tank:
  • It too, although important by the end of WWI, was virtually ignored between WWI and WWII.
    • In England and France--the importance of the horse and military culture.
      • Military leaders reluctant to alter strategies.
      • Viewed the tank as merely an infantry support weapon.
      • Designed for slow movement.
    • Russians and Germans, new military leaders after WWI, receptive to new weapons.
    • Germany, in particular, used tanks in the "Blitzkrieg" and conquered much of Europe in the first years of WWII.

Organizational Interest and The Air Weapon

• Often, plain old-fashioned competition plays a role in development and implementation.
• Airplanes à Bombers – seen as the end of traditional warfare (USA "Army Air Corps," new and "free-thinking." Led by aggressive advocate, General Billy Mitchell).
  • Massive air strikes could break an enemy’s will to fight--destroying land and naval forces.
  • These beliefs were largely untrue in practice.
  • The unwarranted faith in air power is similar to that of resisting new weaponry.
  • Doctrine of strategic bombing served personal and organizational interests: from Army Air Corps to US Air Force (eventually)
  • B-17 (Flying Fortress) became the "game changer" (theory became reality--or maybe not).
    • Designed to take out naval threats.
    • Problem of escort fighters--fuel range.
    • In practice--limited use in naval operations.
    • Even with tight formation, susceptible to fighter attacks and anti-aircraft fire.
  • We resist new weapons or cling to current weapons, despite the evidence that they are ineffective.

Social Revolution and The Enlargement of War

"Technologies are shaped by the societies in which they develop, and they reflect the culture, distribution of power, and economic, organizational, and social relationships." (Volti, page 331)

• Social and political factors not only influence how wars are fought but also the very nature of wars.
• 18^th century à wars were limited. Fought for a King’s whim rather than for the country.
• War fought by professional soldiers isolated from rest of society.
• Enlightenment reasoning limited the extent of wars: reason and rationality (unlike the passionate Catholic/Protestant wars of earlier times).
• Democracy and the rise of the nation-state (nationalism) changed all this (American Revolution).
• French Revolution à citizens no longer passive subjects of the king, but citizens of a nation.
• Warfare now involved a newly emergent citizenry with a vested interest in protecting their interests
• The days of restrained, limited warfare were finished.
  • By 1793, the French army numbered nearly 750,000 (previous battles involved armies of less than 80,000. Napoleon invaded Russia with an army of 600,000).
  • Massive military operations.
  • Expanded production of weapons.
  • Costs rise--taxation, increase in government control and size.
• This new political climate made the reception of new weaponry possible.

• Until 19^th century, military technology developed slowly, usually through trial and error.
• During 19^th century, most improvements came with little support from central governments.
  • Individuals made weaponry and sold products to armies, navies and individuals.
• By 20^th century, governments were no longer willing to sit as passive consumers--they began to develop private weaponry firms.
  • Armstrong-Vickers in Britain
  • Krupp in Germany
  • Employed scientists and engineers whose sole work was focus on weapon development
  • WWII: USA employed 30,000 scientists and engineers in the war effort.
  • Cold War: by the mid-1980s, 70% of federal research and development funds used for military projects.
• The Industrial Revolution made the mass development of weaponry possible.
• Individual craftsmen could never have produced mass quantities.
• Thus, in a sense, mass production allowed for mass armies to go into battle (and for mass consumption).
  • Military-Industrial Complex
• Large armies had large logistical problems
  • Movements must be coordinated.
  • Supplies.
  • Support.
• Again other technologies made large armies possible.
  • Steam engine à transport troops
  • Medical advances à keep troops healthy (previously, most died from disease rather than wounds).

• 20th century à military technology developed faster than ever before.
• How do we advance but not destroy ourselves in the process?
• Drones, ICBMs, "Death Rays," biological weapons.....

Historical Attempts to Limit New Weapons

• Efforts to limit new weapons are not new.
• Pope Innocent II--banned use of the crossbow in 1139.
• Leonardo da Vinci kept secret the details of a submarine he designed, "on account of the evil nature of men who would practice assassinations at the bottom of the seas by breaking the ships to their lowest parts and sinking them together with the crews who are in them." (Volti, page 337)
• Each new advance--raises the costs and consequences, and invokes at least limited concerns.

• 1899 à delegates from 26 nations (at The Hague in the Netherlands) banned the use of asphyxiating gas, dumdum bullets (which exploded inside body), and placed 5 year moratorium on aerial bombardment.
• Such resolutions, however, have no way of ensuring compliance: WWI--poison gas used.
• 1922 Washington Arms Conference: banned poison gas (one country did not agree).
• 1925: Geneva protocol ratified by 42 countries (19 reserved right to use poison gas if used against them).
• A combatant may refrain from using a weapon if he is certain that his opponent will use it in retaliation.
  • Poison Gas à not used for this reason.
  • Also--must protect own soldiers.
  • Fear of retaliation--deterrence.
  • Gas considered "dishonorable" and repulsive.

Gun Control in Old Japan

• 16^th Century à European traders introduce firearms.
• Quickly became dominant weapon on Japanese battlefields.
• Began to disappear in the 17^th century à cultural and political reasons for disappearance.
• Japanese culture deeply infused with martial ethic à Warriors = nobility.
• Military virtues of strength and courage à guns did not fit this cultural orientation.
• Since Japanese were not threatened by foreign armies, it could shut out new technology.
• Only in 19^th century did foreigners threaten Japan’s stability.
• "A superior military technology in not always destined to be universally accepted." (Volti, page 340)

• Both civilian and military, nation against nation agree à A nuclear war is undesirable.
• Nations do not have to like each other to make arms treaties.
• Merely, the fear of unbridled military power needs to be present.

Deterrence, But No More

• Cold War tensions between U.S. and Soviet Union kept in check by MAD àMutually Assured Destruction.
• Both nations could ruin each other with nuclear weaponry.
• Although the Cold War is over, U.S. defense policy still rests on this principle.
• BUT, in order for MAD to be a genuine threat, the weapon must be viable, i.e. it must have immediate potential for use. This is very problematic because mistakes can be made, weapon can be used accidentally.
• An effective deterrent requires the capacity to retaliate quickly and decisively.
• If one country has the ability to destroy an enemy's retaliatory forces in a first air strike, deterrence is lost.
• The vulnerability to a first air strike is a dangerous incentive for a nation to mount an attack on an enemy before damage is suffered.
• Successful arms control agreements must take into account the technological level of the respective military forces.

"The negotiation of arms control agreements takes time, and the development of technology can run ahead of the ability of arms control negotiators to come up with effective means of identifying, counting, and limiting weapons." (Volti, page 342)

• Cruise missiles--arms control requires verification of numbers and deployment. Very difficult with the cruise missile and also difficult to distinguish conventional warheads from nuclear.

The Perils of Proliferation

• Nuclear capabilities of Superpowers is important.
• Perhaps a greater threat is the capabilities of smaller, terrorist nations.
• Some say arms race is inevitable as long as Nation-States are the final power (eight have tested nuclear weapons: USA, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, Pakistan, India, and North Korea).
• Under this premise, the only power that could establish true arms control would be an International government. This is unlikely to happen any time soon.
• Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty--190 signatories in 2012 (5 of the 8 have signed): limits transfer of nuclear weapons or aiding in production. Nonnuclear countries agree to not acquire or develop.
• All of Latin America, except Cuba--Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1968: no nuclear weapons (Cuba ratifies in 2002).
• Yet, those who haven't signed: Pakistan, India, Israel (no testing but probably has weapons), along with North Korea which withdrew in 2003 are certainly cause for concern.
• Main reasons signing countries adhere to the treaty is the assistance provided by "nuclear nations" to assist non-nuclear nations with the development of non-military nuclear power--this may not be fitting for many developing nations, and the difference between non-military and military nuclear development is rather vague.

"Nuclear weapons have created the possibility for unimaginable horrors, but at the same time they provide the best reason to solve our differences in a more intelligent manner than often has been the case for much of human history." (Volti, Rudi. 1995. Society and Technological Change. 3rd edition. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press. Page 247.)

Questions (pages 341-342):

1. In what ways have warfare and military preparation advanced technology? Can you think of any contemporary military technologies that might eventually have civilian applications? Do civilian "spinoffs" from the military sector partially justify today's tremendous expenditures on military technology?
2. During World War I, high-ranking officers sent hundreds of thousands of men to their deaths in futile attempts to gain territory defended by machine guns, artillery, and barbed wire. Why did they do so? Could their social origins and past
   educational experiences have blinded them to the realities of modem warfare?
3. Firearms were suppressed in Tokugawa Japan because it was in the interests of the ruling elite to do so. Are the political elites of modem nations similarly motivated to prevent the development and use of new weapons? Do individual nations differ from one another in this regard?
4. Is mutually assured destruction (MAD) an inherently immoral policy? Can it continue to be the cornerstone of our military policy? Are there any alternatives other than the forging of effective arms control treaties?
5. The history of arms control agreements presents, at best, a mixed record; a few successful agreements are more than balanced by many failures. But nuclear weapons have been held in check up to now. Is there anything about these weapons that makes them better subjects for successful arms control agreements? Is it reasonable to hope that we will succeed in controlling these weapons, or are we living on borrowed time?
6. The threat of retaliation has often prevented attacks from hostile countries. Today, however, an attack may come from an amorphous terrorist group with no significant territorial base. How can retaliation be a credible threat in such
   circumstances? Are there other ways to prevent terrorist attacks?

Chapter 12