COURSE MEETING: Wednesday from 9:30am until 11:45am 2^nd Floor CCB Conference Room.

COURSE DESCRIPTION:

This course explores the theoretical and empirical foundations of IS research in the IS sourcing context. The primary objective is to prepare students to be IS researchers by demonstrating the variety of theories and methodological approaches used to study IS. Students will learn major reference theories adopted from other disciplines and applied to IS research, including transaction cost economics, resource based view, resource dependency theory, agency theory, social exchange theory, social capital theory, institutionalism, power theory, and others. These theories are applied to the IS sourcing context to identify the determinants of IS sourcing, critical success factors, ideal contracts, relationship management, and governance forms. Students will gain an in-depth knowledge of the theories and empirical results of many IS sourcing studies.

GRADING:

10% Active class participation

10% Book Review

60% Weekly quizzes

20% Practice Comprehensive Exam Questions

WEEKLY QUIZZES:

At the start of class each week, I will administer a brief quiz on the assigned readings. The purpose of the quiz is to give you that extra incentive to read all assignments prior to class. The quizzes will assess basic understanding of the material, while the subsequent class discussion will provide more erudite analysis. The lowest two quiz grades will be dropped.

BOOK REVIEWS:

After teaching this seminar several times, I know that my reading lists are quite sizeable. I usually have one classic book and multiple articles each week. I do not want to delete important books, so I have decided that one student will read a book and present a 20-25 minute review of the book for the class using power point slides. Each student will also write a five to ten page report on the book that will be distributed for all students. The book review should cover the brief biographies of the authors, the number of citations to the book, reviews of the book by other scholars, and the significance of the book on scholarship in the original domain and in the information systems domain. If the book focuses on a theory, please be sure to include the theory’s assumptions, major constructs, major propositions, empirical support or refutation of the theory, and criticisms of the theory.

WEEKLY CLASS PARTICIPATION:

It is vital that students attend all sessions. Please make attendance your number one priority. This class will only be valuable if each and every one of us makes a commitment to be prepared. That means that each student must have carefully read all the reading assignments prior to class. I will assess the class participation grade based on my impression of your weekly preparation, meaningful insights, plentiful comments, intellectual curiosity, and enthusiasm.

In a rare circumstance that a student has to miss class (such as the birth of a child or severe illness), please contact me immediately.

Practice Comprehensive Exam Questions:

One of my goals is to help students prepare for comprehensive exams. The practice comprehensive exam will be in the same format as the IS comprehensive exam. The practice exam will comprise two questions from the course. You have two hours to answer the exam. I will find a computerized classroom so that you may use a computer.

STUDENTS: Mike, Rooji, Robert, Stan, Kathy, and Svetlana

Week 1: Aug 26; COURSE OVERVIEW:

In 1945, Kurt Lewin—father of modern social psychology—wrote, “nothing is so practical as a good theory.” We further believe that the dual roles of theorist and practitioner are elemental to human nature. Any agent (whether she is manager or academic) is a theorist when creating abstractions and postulating relationships among the abstractions to make sense of reality. Searle (1997) calls this “world-to-mind” direction of fit. Any agent is a practitioner when applying abstractions to solve a problem, make a decision, or engage in any reasoned action. Searle call this “mind-to-world” direction of fit. Thus, we are all theorists and practitioners.

Good theories are good for practice and good practices are good for theory. In the context of IT outsourcing, there is no shortage of good theories. Nearly twenty years of empirical work on IT outsourcing (ITO) has been guided by a number of theoretical perspectives from economics, strategy, sociology, and systems science (see Table 1). Theories from economics include Transaction Cost Economics, Agency Theory, and various theories on contracting. The main assumption across economic theories is that agents base outsourcing decisions and engage in contracts to minimize total costs and to mitigate risks, such as the risk that an agent or supplier will behave opportunistically. Theories from strategy include the Resource-based view, Resource Dependency Theory, Game Theory, Auction Theory, and various theories of firm strategy. The main assumption across strategic theories is that agents build or acquire resources to execute strategies that lead to “winning”. Theories from sociology include Social/Relational Exchange Theory, Social Capital Theory, Institutionalism, Power Theories, Innovation Diffusion, and Social Cognition. A common focus among these theories is the relationships among agents, including levels of trust and power, feelings of mutual obligation, and social norms. Systems sciences view organizations as organisms that exchange resources across organizational boundaries and learn through feedback. When applied to IT outsourcing, systems approaches are used for modeling outsourcing and examining systems properties that facilitate outsourcing.

Category

Theory

Brief Summary

Relevant Literature

Economic

Transaction Cost Economics

TCE generally addresses the question: why do firms exist? TCE specifically addresses the question: should companies make or buy resources? Make-or-buy decisions are presumed to be made on an economic basis, considering production and transaction costs. Agents match the attributes of the transaction (asset specificity, uncertainty, measurement, and frequency) to the most efficient governance form (market, hybrid, or hierarchy). The attributes indicate the extent to which opportunities exist for agents to behave opportunistically, which increases transaction costs due to increased needs for detailed contracts and monitoring.

Major Constructs:

Production Costs; Transaction Costs; Asset Specificity;

Frequency of Transaction; Uncertainty; Measurability;

Opportunism; Contract Types; Number of suppliers;

Property Rights

Foundational Reading:

Coase (1937)

Williamson (1975, 1979, 1981, 1985, 1991, 1999, 2005)

Examples from ITO literature:

Ang & Straub (1998)

Aubert et al. (1996)

Bahli & Rivard (2003)

Barthélemy & Geyer (2005)

Dibbern & Heinzl (2002)

Dibbern et al. (2008)

Grover et al. (1996)

Heiskanen et al. (1996)

Kishore et al. (2004)

Knolmayer (2002)

Lacity & Willcocks (1995)

Loebbecke & Huyskens (2006)

Loh & Venkatraman (1995)

Miranda & Kim (2006)

Nam et al. (1996)

Ngwenyama & Bryson (1999)

Oh et al. (2006)

Poppo & Lacity (2002)

Poppo & Zenger (1998)

Qu & Brocklehurst (2003)

Shelanski (1991)

Tanriverdi et al. (2007)

Tsang, E., (2000)

Walden (2005)

Agency Theory

AT purports that principal-agent relationships--characterized by different goals and risk preferences--should be efficiently managed, particularly with appropriate contracts. Behavior-based contracts (such as time and materials) is appropriate when outcome uncertainty is high, the agent’s risk aversion is high, and outcomes are not easily measured. Outcome-based contracts (such as fixed price) are appropriate when the principal’s risk aversion is high, outcomes are measurable, and tasks are programmable.

Major Constructs: Contracts; Monitoring, Bonding;

Residual Loss Costs, Task Programmability; Risk Preference

Foundational Reading:

Eisenhardt (1985, 1989)

Sharma (1997)

Examples from ITO literature:

Bahli & Rivard (2003)

Chalos & Sung (1998)

Choudhury & Sabherwal (2003)

Gefen and Carmel (2008)

Gopal et al. (2003)

Hall & Liedtka (2005)

Hancox & Hackney (1999)

Iyer et al. (2005)*

Logan (2000)*

Nelson et. al. (1996)

Oh et al. (2006)

Contracting Theories

Several theories address contracting. Domberger basically argues that outsourcing is a sound decision if the net cost to the outsourcer drops as a result of outsourcing, provided there is no drop in service quality.

Major Constructs: Specialization; Market Discipline; Flexibility; Cost Savings; Contract Type ;

Foundational Reading:

Domberger (1998)

MacNeil (1980)

Examples from ITO literature:

Gopal et al. (2003)

Seddon et al. (2007)

Strategic

Resource-Based View

RBV purports that competitive advantage of a firm arises from developing and deploying unique, valuable, and costly-to-copy capabilities. RBV implies that companies should retain core capabilities, but that non-core capabilities do not have to be owned or controlled. Recent thinking focuses on complementary resources.

Major Constructs: Resource Value; Resource Rareness;

Resource Non-imitablity; Resource Non-substitutability

Foundational Reading:

Barney (1991, 1999)

Examples from ITO literature:

Alvarez-Suescun (2007)

Barthélemy & Geyer (2004)

Duncan (1998)

Levina & Ross (2003)

Roy & Aubert (2002)

Straub et al. (2002)

Teng et al. (1995)

Tsang, E., (2000)

Wade & Hulland (2004)*

Resource Dependency Theory

RDT argues that an organization’s dependence on external resources (outsourcing) is determined by the importance of the resource to the organization, the number of potential suppliers, and the cost of switching suppliers. Organizations try to minimize dependence when possible.

Major Constructs: External Environment; Concentration;

Munificence; Interconnectedness

Foundational Reading:

Pfeffer & Salancik (1978)

Pfeffer (1982, 1994)

Examples from ITO literature:

Grover et al. (1996)

Grover et al. (1997)

Oh et al. (2006)

Teng et al. (1995)

Straub et al. (2008)

Firm Strategy

Firms enact strategies to achieve a competitive advantage. Porter views that a firm’s competitive advantage is either low cost producer (more efficient than rivals) or differentiator (firm differentiates itself from rivals). Miles and Snow proposed that organizations may be prospectors (seeking to innovate), defenders (seeking stability), analyzers (seeking stability in operations but innovation at the margins), or reactors (reacting to the environment). Pralahad and Hamel argue that the best strategy is to focus on core capabilities and outsource the rest.

Major Constructs: Differentiation; Low Cost Producer; Prospector; Defender; Analyzer; Reactor

Foundational Reading:

Chandler (1962)

Miles & Snow (1978)

Porter (1980, 1985)

Pralahad & Hamel (1990)

Examples from ITO literature:

Aubert et al. (2008)

Apte & Mason (1995)

Bardhan et al. (2006)

DiRomualdo & Gurbaxani (1998)

Grover et al. (1994)

Hall & Liedtka (2005)

Loebbecke & Huyskens (2006)

McLellan et al. (1995)

Michell & Fitzgerald (1997)

Slaughter & Ang (1996)

Game Theory/

Auction Theory

Game Theory posits that an agent considers other agents’ strategies before choosing a strategy to maximize his/her own return. Auction theory is a subset of game theory that examines how agents act in auction markets. These theories are applied to customer-supplier bidding and negotiations.

Major Constructs: Payoff Calculation; Opponent Assessment; Information Asymmetry; Winner’s Curse;

Nash Equilibrium

Foundational Reading:

Nash (1951, 1953)

Milgrom & Weber (1982)

Examples from ITO literature:

Bhargava & Sundaresan (2004)

Chaudhury et al. (1995)

Elitzur & Wensley (1997)

Kern et al. (2002)

Klotz & Chatterjee (1995)

Wang et al. (1997)

Whang (1992)

Social

Social/

Relational Exchange Theory

Relationships between customers and suppliers are based on trust developed over time (partnership advantage). Rousseau views a contract as mental beliefs and expectations parties have about their mutual obligations based on perceived promises of a reciprocal exchange.

Major Constructs: Trust; Culture; Personal Satisfaction;

Gain; Psychological obligations; Social Exchange

Foundational Reading:

Blau (1964) ;

Ekeh (1974)

Emerson (1972) ;

Homans (1961,1974) ;

Rousseau (1990)

Examples from ITO literature:

Adler (2003/2004)

Ang & Slaughter (2001)

Goles (2001)

Goles & Chin (2002)

Goo et al. (2009)

Grover et al. (1996)

Klepper (1995)

Koh et al. (2004)

Lee & Kim (1999)

Oza et al. (2006)

Poppo & Zenger (2002)

Sabherwal (1999)

Whitten & Leidner (2006)

Social Capital Theory

In general, the theory posits that social capital facilitates the exchange and recombination of existing intellectual capital to form new intellectual capital, and that an organization has an advantage over markets in this regard.

Major Constructs: Structural, Cognitive, and

Relational Dimensions of Social Capital

Foundational Reading:

Nahapiet, J., and Ghosal (1998)

Examples from ITO literature:

Chou et al. (2006)

George (2006)

Lacity & Rottman (2008)

Miranda & Kavan (2005)

Okoli & Wonseok (2007)

Rottman (2008)

Institution-alism

The subset of this theory, institutional isomorphism studies how organizations eventually adopt similar practices through three mechanisms of influence: force, mimicking, and norms.

Major Constructs: Mechanisms of Isomorphic Change: Coercive, Mimetic, Normative

Foundational Reading:

DiMaggio & Powell (1991)

Examples from ITO literature:

Ang & Cummings (1997)

Barthélemy & Geyer (2004)

Jayatilaka (2001)

Jayatilaka (2002)

Miranda & Kim (2006)

Power Theories

Organizational decision-making processes are characterized by the power and political tactics of stakeholders involved. Political tactics include the selective use of decision criteria, selective use of information, use of outside experts, building coalitions, and cooptation (swaying opposition by making them participants), framing, using interpersonal influence, and timing. Sources of power include position of authority, ability to acquire or control resources that others value but few possess, location in the communication network, being in the right sub-unit, the ability to absorb uncertainty and personal characteristics.

Major Constructs: Sources of Power; Political Tactics

Foundational Reading:

Pfeffer (1981, 1994)

Examples from ITO literature:

Allen et al. (2002)

Dibbern & Heinzl (2002)

Lacity and Hirschheim (1993)

Lee & Kim (1999)

Peled (2001)

Innovation Diffusion

ID posits that the rate at which individuals adopt innovations depends on attributes of the innovation, communication channels, and social norms. The rate at which organizations adopt innovations depends on leadership, characteristics of the organization, and system openness.

Major Constructs: Innovation, Individual, Organizational and Environmental Characteristics; S-shaped adoption curve; Social Norms;

Foundational Reading:

Rogers (1983)

Examples from ITO literature:

Hu et al. (1997)

Loh and Venkatraman (1992b)

Social Cognition

Social cognition theory studies how ordinary people think about other people (phenomenology) and how people think they think about people (naïve scientists)

Major Constructs: Persistent Expectations;

Schemas, Scripts, & Frames; Decision-making & Causal Analysis

Foundational Reading:

Fiske & Taylor (1991)

Examples from ITO literature:

Ho et al. (2003)

Systems

Theories

General Systems Theory

Many behavioral researchers believe social systems are like living organisms in the sense that both display wholeness, interact with their environment, exhibit strategies of self-maintenance, and experience cycles of birth, growth, maturity and death.

Major Constructs: Equifinality; Control; Feedback

Foundational Reading:

von Bertalanffy (1968)

Examples from ITO literature:

Marcolin & Ross (2005)

Systems Dynamics

SD models are mathematical representations of the causal structure of systems. SD assumes that structure causes behavior

Major Constructs: Causal links; Causal loops

Foundational Reading:

Forrester (1996);

Richardson (1996)

Examples from ITO literature:

Dutta and Roy (2005)

Modular Systems Theory

The extent to which a business process is loosely coupled, mature, and standardized enough to be separated from a firm’s other business processes for outsourcing.

Major Constructs: Modularity

Foundational Reading:

Sanchez & Mahoney (1996)

Examples from ITO literature:

Tanriverdi et al. (2007)

Miscellaneous

Global Disaggregation: Apte & Mason (1995)

Residual Rights Theory: Lee et al. (2004)

Week 2: Sept 2; UNDERSTANDING PRACTICE:

I teach an entire course on the practice of outsourcing called "Global Sourcing of Business and IT Services" (IS 6848). I believe that before we can make academic contributions, we must understand the context we aim to study. Ideally, Ph.D. students should take IS 6848 before IS 7893. For those of you who have not taken IS 6848, I have devoted this week to providing an overview to practice before we launch into the theories used in outsourcing research. If you have not yet taken IS 6848, please watch the WIMBA recording that I use as an introduction to IS 6848 BEFORE coming to the Ph.D. seminar this week. You’ll have to ignore the references to course assignments as they do not pertain to IS 7893. But the WIMBA recording will help give you a context for this week’s readings.

DiRomualdo, A., and Gurbaxani, V. (1998), “Strategic Intent for IT Outsourcing,” Sloan Management Review, Vol. 39, 4, p. 67-80.

Lacity, M., and Willcocks, L. (1998), "An empirical investigation of information technology sourcing practices: Lessons from experience," MIS Quarterly, Vol. 22, 3, pp. 363-408. (updated data is in chapter 6 Lacity and Willcocks 2001).

Levina, N., and Ross, J. (2003), “From the Vendor’s Perspective: Exploring the Value Proposition in Information Technology Outsourcing,” MIS Quarterly, Vol. 27, 3, pp. 331-364.

Lacity, M., Willcocks, L., and Rottman, J. (2008), “Global Outsourcing of Back Office Services: Lessons, Trends and Enduring Challenges,” Strategic Outsourcing: An International Journal, Vol. 1, 1, 2008.

BOOK REVIEW (Robert): This is a good source for detailed understanding about how organizations actually made and implemented large-scale ITO decisions: Lacity, M. and Willcocks, L. (2001), Global Information Technology Outsourcing: Search for Business Advantage, Wiley, Chichester.

Week 3: Sept 9; Overview of entire academic literature:

Dibbern, J., Goles, T., Hirschheim, R., and Bandula, J. (2004), "Information Systems Outsourcing: A Survey and Analysis of the Literature," Database for Advances in Information Systems, Vol 34, 4, Fall 2004, pp. 6-102.

Lacity, M., Khan, S., and Willcocks, L. (2009), “A Review of the IT Outsourcing Literature: Insights for Practice,” Journal of Strategic Information Systems, forthcoming.

Week 4: Sept 16; TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS:

Williamson, O. (1991), “Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives,” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, 2, pp. 269-296.

Williamson, O. (2005), “The Economics of Governance,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 95, 2; pp. 1-18.

Ghosal, S., and Morgan, P. (1996), “Bad for Practice: A Critique of Transaction Cost Theory,” Academy of Management Review, Vol. 21, pp. 13-47.

Barney, J. (1999), “How a Firm’s Capabilities Affect Boundary Decisions,” Sloan Management Review, Vol 40, 3, pp. 137-145.

BOOK REVIEW (Rooji): Williamson, O., and Masten, S. (1999), The Economics of Transaction Costs, An Elgar Critical Writings Reader, Cheltenham, UK.

Week 5: Sept 23; TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS:

Ang, S. and Straub, D. (1998), "Production and Transaction Economies and IS Outsourcing: A Study of the U.S. Banking Industry," MIS Quarterly, Vol. 22, 4, pp. 535-552.

Nam, K., Rajagopalan, S., Rao, H. R. and Chaudhury, A. (1996), "A Two-Level Investigation of Information Systems Outsourcing," Communications of the ACM, Vol. 39, No. 7, pp. 36-44.

Lacity, M. and Willcocks, L. (1995). Interpreting Information Technology Sourcing Decisions From A Transaction Cost Perspective: Findings and Critique. Accounting, Management and Information Technology, 5, 3/4, 203-244.

Poppo, L. and Zenger, T. (1998), "Testing Alternative Theories of the Firm: Transaction Cost, Knowledge-Based, and Measurement Explanations for Make-or-Buy Decisions in Information Services," Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19, pp. 853-877.

Dibbern, J., Winkler, J., and Heinzl, A. (2008), “Explaining variations in client extra costs between software projects offshored to India,” MIS Quarterly, Vol. 32, 2, pp.333-366.

Week 6: Sept 30; AGENCY THEORY:

(contracting continued): Lee, J., Miranda, S., and Kim, Y. (2004), "IT Outsourcing Strategies: Universalistic, Contingency, and Configurational Explanations of Success," Information Systems Research, Vol. 15, 2, pp. 110-131.

Eisenhardt, K. (1989), "Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review," The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 14, 1, pp. 57-76.

Sharma, A. (1997), "Professional as agent: Knowledge asymmetry in agency exchange," Academy of Management Review, Vol. 22, 3, pp. 758-798.

Oh, W., Gallivan, M., and Kim, J., (2006), “The Market's Perception of the Transactional Risks of Information Technology Outsourcing Announcements,” Journal of Management Information Systems, Vol. 22, 4, pp. 271-303.

Week 7: Oct 7; AGENCY THEORY

Hall, J., and Liedtka, S. (2005), "Financial Performance, CEO Compensation, and Large-Scale Information Technology Outsourcing Decisions," Journal of Management Information Systems, Vol. 22, 1, pp. 193 – 222.

Gopal, A., Sivaramakrishnan, K., Krishnan, M., and Mukhopadhyay, T. (2003), "Contracts in Offshore Software Development: An Empirical Analysis," Management Science, Vol. 49, 12, pp. 1671-1683.

Gefen, D., and Carmel, E., “Is the World Really Flat? A Look at Offshoring at an Online Programming Marketplace,” MIS Quarterly, Vol. 32, 2, pp. 367-384.

Week 8: Oct 14; RESOURCE BASED VIEW:

Michalisin, Michael, "In search of strategic assets", International Journal of Organizational Analysis, Bowling Green; Oct 1997; Vol. 5, Iss. 4; pg. 360, 28 pgs

Barney, J. (1991), "Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage," Journal of Management, Vol. 17, 1, pp. 99-120.

Espino-Rodriguez, T. and Padron-Robaina, V. (2006), “A Review of Outsourcing From the Resource-based View of the Firm,” International Journal pf Management Review, Vol. 8, 1, pp. 49-70.

Alvarez-Suescun, A. (2007), “Testing resource-based propositions about IS sourcing decisions,” Industrial Management & Data Systems, Vol. 107, 6, pp. 762-229.

Teng, J., Cheon, M., and Grover, V. (1995), "Decisions to Outsource Information Systems Functions: Testing a Strategy-Theoretic Discrepancy Model," Decision Sciences, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 75-103.

Week 9: Oct 21; RESOURCE DEPENDENCY THEORY & POWER THEORY:

BOOK REVIEW (Stan): Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G. (1978), The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective, New York: Harper & Row; reprinted by Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2003.

Straub, D., Weill, P., and Schwaig, "Strategic Dependence on the IT Resource and Outsourcing: A Test of Strategic Control Model,” Information Systems Frontiers, Vol. 10, 1.

OPTIONAL READING: Hillman, A., Withers, M., and Collins, B. (2009), “Resource Dependence Theory: A Review,” Journal of Management.

OPTIONAL READING: Davis, G., and Cobb, J. (2009), “Resource Dependence Theory: Past and Future,” Research in the Sociology of Organizations.

BOOK REVIEW (Mary): Pfeffer, J. (1994), Managing With Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1994.

Lacity, M., and Hirschheim, R. (1993), "Theoretical Foundations of Outsourcing Decisions: The Political Model", from Information Systems Outsourcing: Myths, Metaphors, and Realities, Wiley, Chichester, pp. 37-47; 197-229;

Week 10: Oct 28; SOCIAL/RELATIONAL EXCHANGE THEORY

BOOK REVIEW (Mike): Ekeh, Peter, Social Exchange Theory: The Two Traditions, Harvard University Press, 1974. pay particular attention to chapter 7.

Ang, S., and Slaughter, S., (2001), “Work Outcomes and Job Design for Contract Versus Permanent Information Systems Professionals on Software Development Teams,” MIS Quarterly, Vol. 25, 3, pp. 321-350.

Lee, J., and Kim, Y. (1999), "Effect of Partnership Quality on IS Outsourcing Success: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Validation," Journal of Management Information Systems, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 29-61.

Sabherwal, R. (1999), "The Role of Trust in Outsourced IS Development Projects," Communications of the ACM, Vol. 42, 2, pp. 80-86.

Week 11: Nov 4; SOCIAL/RELATIONAL EXCHANGE THEORY

Grover, V., Cheon, M., and Teng, J. (1996), "The Effect of Service Quality and Partnership on the Outsourcing of Information Systems Functions," Journal of Management Information Systems, Vol. 12, 4, pp. 89-116.

Whitten, D., and Leidner, D. (2006), “Bringing Back IT: An Analysis of the Decision to Backsource or Switch Vendors,” Decision Sciences, Vol. 37, 4, pp. 605-621.

Poppo, L. and Zenger, T. (2002), “Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or Complements?” Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 23, pp. 707-725.

Goo, J., Kishore, R., Rao, H. R., and Nam, K., (2009), “The role of service level agreements in relational management of information technology outsourcing: An empirical study,” MIS Quarterly, Vol. 33, 1, pp. 1-28.

BOOK REVIEW (Kathy): Carmel, E., and Tjia, P. (2005), Offshoring Information Technology: Sourcing and Outsourcing to a Global Workforce, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Week 12: Nov 11; INSTITUTIONALISM

DiMaggio, P., and Powell, W. (1991), "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, (Powell & DiMaggio eds), The University of Chicago Press, pp. 63-82.

Ang, S. and Cummings, L. (1997), "Strategic Response to Institutional Influences on Information Systems Outsourcing," Organization Science, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 235-256.

Miranda, S, and Kim, Y. (2006), “Professionalism Versus Political Contexts: Institutional Mitigation and the Transaction Cost Heuristic in Information Systems Outsourcing,” MIS Quarterly. Vol. 30, 3, p. 725-753.

Week 13: Nov 18; SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY

BOOK REVIEW (Svetlana): Lin,N., Cook, K., Burt, R., Social Capital: Theory and Research, Aldine De Gruyter, (2001)

Nahapiet, J., and Ghosal, S. (1998), “Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational Advantage,” Academy of Management Review, Vol. 23, 2, pp. 242-265.

Yang, S., Lee, H., and Kurnia, S. (2009), "Social Capital in Information and Communications Technology Research: Past, Present, and Future," Communications of the AIS, Article 23.

Okoli, C., and Oh, Wonseok, “Investigating Recognition-based Performance in an Open Community: A Social Capital Perspective,” Information and Management, Vol. 44, 2007, pp. 240-252.

Lacity, M. and Rottman, J. (2008), Offshore Outsourcing of IT Work, Palgrave, United Kingdom, Chapter 4.

Week 14: December 2; IN CLASS EXAM

COURSE MEETING: Wednesday from 9:30am until 11:45am 2nd Floor CCB Conference Room.

COURSE DESCRIPTION:

COURSE MEETING: Wednesday from 9:30am until 11:45am 2^nd Floor CCB Conference Room.