Immigrant Resentment and Voter Fraud Beliefs in the U.S. Electorate

Adriano Udani1 and David C. Kimball1

Abstract
Public beliefs about the frequency of voter fraud are frequently cited to support restrictive voting laws in the United States. However, some sources of public beliefs about voter fraud have received little attention. We identify two conditions that combine to make anti-immigrant attitudes a strong predictor of voter fraud beliefs. First, the recent growth and dispersion of the immigrant population makes immigration a salient consideration for many Americans. Second, an immigrant threat narrative in political discourse linking immigration to crime and political dysfunction has been extended to the voting domain. Using new data from a survey module in the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study and the 2012 American National Election Study, we show that immigrant resentment is strongly associated with voter fraud beliefs. Widespread hostility toward immigrants helps nourish public beliefs about voter fraud and support for voting restrictions in the United States. The conditions generating this relationship in public opinion likely exist in other nations roiled by immigration politics. The topic of fraudulent electoral practices will likely continue to provoke voters to call to mind groups that are politically constructed as “un-American.”

Keywords
immigration, race and ethnic politics, electoral integrity, voter fraud, voting behavior

1University of Missouri–St. Louis, USA

Corresponding Author:
Adriano Udani, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Missouri–St. Louis, One University Blvd., 812 Tower, St. Louis, MO 63121, USA.
Email: udania@umsl.edu
Introduction

Public concerns about voting integrity are more than an academic curiosity, since they are frequently cited to support particular election reforms. In two recent Supreme Court cases, *Purcell v. Gonzalez* (2006) and *Crawford v. Marion County* (2008), the majority decision accepted state arguments that voting restrictions, such as photo identification and proof of citizenship requirements, are needed to maintain public confidence in elections. Similarly, lawmakers frequently invoke public concerns about voter fraud as the basis for new voting restrictions (Hasen, 2012; Minnite, 2010). Indeed, people who believe that voter fraud is common are more likely to favor laws requiring voters to show a photo ID before being allowed to cast a ballot (D. C. Wilson & Brewer, 2013). Beliefs about widespread voter fraud have filtered across the American mass public, despite evidence that voter fraud occurs very rarely (Ahlquist, Mayer, & Jackman, 2014; Ansolabehere, Luks, & Schaffner, 2015; Christensen & Schultz, 2014; Levitt, 2014; Minnite, 2010).

Given that beliefs about widespread voter fraud are influential in driving public support for voter restrictions, it is important to understand the sources of these beliefs. While the literature on voter fraud beliefs is emerging, we argue that attitudes toward immigrants are an understudied source of public beliefs about how much voter fraud occurs. Two conditions in the United States are expected to produce a strong association between anti-immigrant attitudes and public beliefs about voter fraud: (a) relatively high levels of immigration in recent years that make immigration a salient national issue and (b) an immigrant threat narrative in political rhetoric that frames immigrants as criminals and undeserving of the rights of citizenship. Elite claims about voter fraud frequently incorporate elements of immigrant threat language. For example, upon taking office in 2017, President Donald Trump called for a major investigation into voter fraud after alleging that millions of undocumented immigrants cast illegal votes to deliver the nationwide popular vote to Hillary Clinton (House & Dennis, 2017). Trump also centered his campaign for president around anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy proposals, though he is certainly not the first politician to frame immigrants as criminals or fraudulent voters. While we test this theory on the United States, we believe that anti-immigrant attitudes will be a potent predictor of voter fraud beliefs in other countries where these conditions also exist.

We argue that a person’s animosity toward immigrants—particularly, immigrant resentment—is a highly influential predisposition since its components reflect attitudes toward crime, deserving membership in the polity, perceived threats to American traditions, and fears about losing political influence. Recent political rhetoric frequently combines these elements by linking immigration
with crime and voter fraud in particular. We posit that similar attitudes are
called to mind when people attempt to enumerate instances of voter fraud in
U.S. elections. By bridging the literatures on immigrant threat and voter fraud,
our study is the first to theorize and test a link between public attitudes toward
election integrity and anti-immigrant attitudes.

We report the results of two studies to examine the relationship between
attitudes toward immigrants and voter fraud beliefs. Our first study reports
results from a survey module in the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election
Study (CCES). We test an immigrant resentment hypothesis along with domi-
nant frameworks in political science. Our second study examines public per-
ceptions of election integrity in the United States using data from the 2012
American National Election Study (ANES). In each study, we find that anti-
immigrant attitudes strongly predict beliefs about voter fraud, often outper-
forming conventional political predispositions and contextual measures.

We organize the article as follows. First, we explain the reasons for which
anti-immigrant attitudes should be associated with voter fraud beliefs. We
then provide an overview of scholarship on public beliefs about voter fraud.
Next, we present our data, methods, and evidence from our two studies.
Finally, we provide some concluding remarks about our results.

Anti-Immigrant Attitudes and Voter Fraud
Perceptions

Existing scholarship indicates that political predispositions, general orienta-
tions toward the political system, and racial attitudes are the most reliable
predictors of public beliefs about voter fraud. Reflecting the nature of politi-
cal debate about proposed voting restrictions, Republicans and conserva-
tives tend to believe that voter fraud occurs more frequently than Democrats
and liberals (Bowler, Brunell, Donovan, & Gronke, 2015; D. C. Wilson &
Brewer, 2013; D. C. Wilson & King-Meadows, 2016). Furthermore, there is
clear evidence of a sore loser effect in voter fraud beliefs, as supporters of
winning candidates hold more positive assessments of election integrity
than supporters of losing candidates (Beaulieu, 2014; Sances & Stewart,
2015; Wolak, 2014).

Certain predispositions and acts that signal closer connections to the politi-
cal system also shape beliefs about voter fraud. Voters and people with
higher levels of political efficacy and trust in government tend to hold more
positive beliefs about election integrity (Wolak, 2014). In addition, people
with higher levels of education and political knowledge tend to be more san-
guine about voter fraud in the United States (Bowler et al., 2015; Wolak,
2014). Similarly, messages from political elites, particularly trusted leaders,
can influence public beliefs about voter fraud (Beaulieu, 2014; Vonnahme & Miller, 2013; D. C. Wilson & Brewer, 2013).

Finally, there is some evidence that the issue of voter fraud has become racialized. Political debates about restrictive voting laws often feature arguments about how those laws will affect people of color, who are less likely to possess a government-issued photo ID or the documents needed to obtain one (Barreto, Nuño, & Sanchez, 2009; Hershey, 2009). In some instances, political rhetoric includes pointed allegations of voter fraud by people of color (Appleby & Federico, 2017; Dreier & Martin, 2010; Ellis, 2014; Hasen, 2012, pp. 44, 65-67; Minnite, 2010; D. C. Wilson & Brewer, 2013). As a result, some have found a positive relationship between racial resentment and public beliefs about voter fraud (Appleby & Federico, 2017; D. C. Wilson & Brewer, 2013). Current scholarship on voter fraud builds on a racial spillover effect of President Obama’s historic status as the nation’s first African American president (Appleby & Federico, 2017). In turn, they find that perceptions of the fairness of the presidential election and integrity of the vote became racialized in 2008 and 2012. Nevertheless, existing research has largely ignored public attitudes toward immigrants as a source of beliefs about voter fraud.

Why should attitudes toward immigrants influence public beliefs about voter fraud? One mechanism linking the two sets of attitudes would be empirical evidence of higher rates of voter fraud among immigrants. Available evidence suggests that voter fraud is extremely rare and that noncitizen voting is even less common than other forms of election fraud, such as absentee fraud and ballot tampering by officials (Ansolabehere et al., 2015; Kahn & Carson, 2012).¹ One study found 33 complaints of noncitizen voting during a decade of elections in California and Oregon but only four cases that led to convictions (Minnite, 2010). A nationwide investigation of all reported instances of voter fraud from 2000 to 2012 found just 56 cases of alleged noncitizen voting (Kahn & Carson, 2012). Most voter fraud allegations are made leading up to a major election, particularly in electorally competitive states, suggesting that voter fraud allegations are used as a voter mobilization strategy (Fogarty, Curtis, Gouzien, Kimball, & Vorst, 2015; Hasen, 2012).

Some elite rhetoric tends to exaggerate the frequency of noncitizen voting in the United States. For example, in 2011, Colorado Secretary of State Scott Gessler (R) claimed that 12,000 registered voters were not citizens out of more than 3 million registered voters in the state (Siegelbaum, 2011). Gesler further claimed that 5,000 noncitizens voted in the 2010 general election in Colorado (Siegelbaum, 2011). On further investigation, most of the people on the list were American citizens, and the state ultimately identified only 35 alleged noncitizens who voted in Colorado (Hoover, 2012). In Florida, the
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles estimated a potential 180,000 noncitizens registered among the state’s 12 million registered voters in 2011 (Dixon, 2012). Florida Governor Rick Scott (R-FL) ordered a statewide effort to remove immigrants from the state’s voting rolls. However, the initial estimate included extensive errors, and a subsequent investigation found just 38 alleged noncitizens voted in Florida (Powers, Haughney, & Williams, 2012), and only one person was convicted of noncitizen voting in Florida.

A more likely mechanism linking attitudes toward immigrants and beliefs about voter fraud relies on two conditions: (a) the growth of foreign-born groups in historically newer U.S. destinations, increasing the salience of immigration attitudes in the mass public; and (b) political rhetoric that often paints immigrants as lawbreakers, thus priming attitudes toward immigrants when people think about criminal behavior, including voter fraud. These conditions are similar to Kinder and Kam’s (2009) theory about the conditions that “activate” ethnocentrism as a powerful force in public opinion.

On the first condition, the United States has experienced relatively high levels of immigration over the past 20 years, with most of the recent wave of immigrants coming from Latin America and Asia (Hajnal & Lee, 2011, p. 10; Garand, Xu, & Davis, 2015). Currently, the foreign-born share of the total population in the United States is higher than it has been in almost 100 years. Between 1990 and 2000, the total U.S. foreign-born population grew by 57% from 19.8 million to 31.1 million. Between 2000 and 2009, the number of immigrants grew by 24% from 31.1 million to 38.5 million. In addition, the number of unauthorized immigrants peaked at 12.2 million in 2007 and has remained relatively stable since 2009 after rising for nearly two decades (Passel & Cohn, 2016).

Furthermore, the foreign-born population is now more dispersed across the United States, with recent immigrants settling in racially and ethnically homogeneous areas where immigrants have historically been absent (Marrow, 2011; Massey, 2008; Singer, 2004). Scholars have found an increase in “new destination” states, cities, and rural areas that had not experienced much immigration since the 1960s (Cisneros, 2009; Marrow, 2011; J. Wilson & Singer, 2011). While traditional destination states—such as New York, Illinois, California, Texas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Florida—continue to receive large numbers of immigrants, the foreign-born population grew by 49% or more, twice the national rate between 2000 and 2009, in mostly southern and Midwestern regions of the United States (Passel & Cohn, 2011; Terrazas, 2011).

Scholarship on racial and ethnic group threat suggests that the growth and dispersion of immigrant groups across the United States is related to the
second condition. That is, demographic changes in one’s community fosters a sense of perceived threat among native-born U.S. citizens (Hopkins, 2010; Newman, 2013). Others show that a considerable portion of American voters feel that increased growth rates of immigrants lead to reductions in employment prospects, safety, and “American” values (Branton, Cassese, Jones, & Westerland, 2011; Schildkraut, 2011). Large proportionate changes in state immigrant populations produce intensive sociocultural changes that represent a challenge to a state’s ethnic and cultural status quo while generating a higher degree of anti-immigrant sentiment (Newman, Johnston, Strickland, & Citrin, 2012). In some quarters, there is also a longstanding strain of anxiety about demographic change in the United States, a fear that the country as they know it is slipping away (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015).

On the second condition, the extent to which a person’s anti-immigrant attitudes structure perceptions of how much voter fraud occurs in the U.S. election will depend on an “immigrant threat” narrative commonly found in political and policy discourse (Abrajano & Hajnal, 2015; Albertson & Gadarian, 2015). Sudden increases in ethnic diversity, complimented by mainstream political discourse that arouses public anxiety about an increasingly diverse country, are associated with increases in anti-immigrant attitudes (Hopkins, 2010). The threat narrative broadly links concerns over immigration to crime, job loss, and several other social and political maladies (Abrajano & Hajnal, 2015; Albertson & Gadarian, 2015). Some argue that perceived threat manifests as resentment toward immigrants generally (Schildkraut, 2011). Resentment takes the form of negative stereotypes about immigrants as a monolithic group, fears about cultural and political decline, beliefs that immigrants are not equally deserving of political rights and that immigrants engage in criminal activity.

Voter fraud is another type of crime, and rhetoric about voter fraud from prominent politicians often extends this connection between immigration and criminal behavior to the voting domain. Elite rhetoric about voter fraud is often vague, but when a specific mechanism is provided, it tends to focus on allegations of noncitizens voting in elections (Fogarty et al., 2015). For example, President Trump has made the unsupported claim that he lost the popular vote in the 2016 election because millions of undocumented immigrants participated illegally in the election (House & Dennis, 2017). In congressional testimony, Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach alleged that “the problem of aliens registering to vote is a massive one, nationwide” (Kobach, 2015). The recent increase in immigration, combined with elite rhetoric and media coverage that stereotype noncitizens as criminals, may prime attitudes toward immigrants when Americans think about voter fraud. This suggests the following:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Higher levels of immigrant resentment are associated with the perception that voter fraud occurs more frequently in U.S. elections.

Others argue that the perceived threat arises specifically from Mexicans, who pundits and political elites have constructed as the stereotypical immigrant (Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008). When Americans imagine a stereotypical immigrant, studies suggest that they tend to envision a Latino (Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Dunaway, Branton, & Abrajano, 2010; Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000; Haynes, Merolla, & Ramakrishnan, 2016), while visual cues of "Latino-looking" people elicit restrictive immigration attitudes among U.S. voters (Brader et al., 2008). As such, these findings indicate that

Hypothesis 2 (H2): More negative attitudes toward Latinos, particularly Mexican immigrants, are associated with the perception that voter fraud occurs more frequently.

Finally, studies also suggest that threatened sentiments mainly come from an animosity toward undocumented immigrants. Paul Broun, a Republican running for a U.S. Senate seat in Georgia in 2014, stated that Democrats can only win elections in the state with the votes of “illegal aliens” (Galloway, 2014). Haynes, Merolla, and Ramakrishnan (2016) show that mainstream political rhetoric continues to construct immigration as a problem of social deviance (i.e., immigrants illegally crossing the border). Undocumented immigrants are often portrayed as being deceptive in trying to acquire welfare benefits and legal residence at the cost of law-abiding and deserving Americans (Garand et al., 2015; Hussey & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2013). Xia Wang (2012) finds that perceptions of undocumented immigrants as a criminal threat is positively associated with the perceived size of the undocumented immigrant population. These findings suggest that

Hypothesis 3 (H3): More negative attitudes toward undocumented immigrants are associated with the perception that voter fraud occurs more frequently in U.S. elections.

Study 1: Using Racial and Ethnic Attitudes in the 2014 CCES

In this study, our main objective is to test whether voter fraud beliefs are associated specifically with anti-immigrant attitudes while controlling for relevant political dispositions. We use survey data from a module of 1,000 respondents to the 2014 CCES. The survey was conducted online by YouGov
and included a pre-election wave conducted before the November elections and a post-election wave fielded after the elections. To understand the determinants of voter fraud beliefs, we collect data on respondents’ political attitudes and social characteristics before the election, and then measure their voter fraud beliefs after the election. A detailed description of our variables is provided in the online appendix.

Public perceptions about election fraud can be measured on several dimensions: (a) who is committing fraud—individual voters or election officials, (b) the frequency of fraudulent acts, and (c) the significance of fraudulent acts. Our main dependent variable measures beliefs about the frequency of voter fraud, focusing primarily on fraud committed by voters. These frequency measures were previously used in the Survey of the Performance of American Elections and another peer-reviewed study (Bowler & Donovan, 2016; Stewart, 2013). In addition, beliefs about the frequency of voter fraud are more strongly correlated with election policy preferences than other common measures of voter confidence and election integrity perceptions (Udani & Kimball, 2017). In the CCES post-election module, respondents are asked how frequently four different types of voter fraud occur in the United States: noncitizen voting, voter impersonation, double voting, and ballot tampering. We randomize the order of fraudulent activities that participants view. There is considerable variation across individuals in voter fraud beliefs, and roughly 20% of respondents in the CCES module believe that acts of voter fraud are “very common.” Our sample is similar to prior surveys in terms of baseline beliefs about voter fraud and support for photo ID laws (see Table A-1 in the online appendix). Responses to the voter fraud items are coded from 1 to 4 with the most frequent category at the high end of the scale. An exploratory factor analysis of the four items reveals just one factor, with the item dealing with official vote tampering producing the weakest factor loading. Excluding vote tampering, the other three items form a reliable scale (α = .92). There is also relatively little variation in aggregate beliefs across the different types of voter fraud, although respondents tend to believe that noncitizen voting occurs more frequently than other acts of fraudulent voting (see Table A-2 in the online appendix). This suggests that people hold general beliefs about voter fraud and do not distinguish between different sources of voter fraud. Our voter fraud index is created by averaging the responses to each of the three items. Higher scores on the scale indicate beliefs that voter fraud occurs more frequently.

To investigate whether animosity toward immigrants predicts beliefs about voter fraud, we create several measures of attitudes toward immigrants based on questions in the pre-election wave of the survey. We create a measure of immigrant resentment based on six randomly ordered questions that
ask how much respondents agree or disagree with statements about the impact of immigration. These items, which tap into dimensions involving cultural beliefs, group conflict, political influence, and different forms of resentment, form a reliable scale \((\alpha = .84)\), with higher scores indicating greater resentment of immigrants. A majority of respondents fall on the resentful side of the scale. Respondents in the bottom third of the Immigrant Resentment Scale tend to believe that voter fraud occurs infrequently, with a mean score of 1.9 on the voter fraud index (which ranges from 1 to 4). Mean voter fraud beliefs are higher for respondents in the middle third (2.5) and highest third (3.0) of the Immigrant Resentment Scale. This provides preliminary support for H1.

To account for animosity toward illegal immigrants, we measure affect toward illegal immigrants with a feeling thermometer, with larger (smaller) values reflecting more warmth (coldness). To account for anti-Latino sentiments that often are associated with attitudes toward U.S. immigration, we use two batteries of stereotype questions that ask respondents whether Latinos are lazier and less intelligent than Whites, African Americans, and Asian Americans \((\alpha = .70)\). Our Immigrant Resentment Scale generates a solid correlation with the thermometer rating of illegal immigrants \((r = .44)\) and a weaker correlation with the Latino Stereotype Scale \((r = .30)\).

We try to control for as many alternative sources of voter fraud beliefs as possible with CCES data. For example, one’s identity as an American may influence optimism toward election administration. Studies suggest that those with high levels of national pride tend to offer more positive assessments of electoral integrity \((\text{Schildkraut, 2011; Wolak, 2014})\). To this end, we suspect that voter fraud beliefs will be lower among voters who are not only highly patriotic but also native-born residents whose family members were all born in the United States. The CCES allowed respondents to choose which of the following categories best describes them: immigrant citizens, immigrant noncitizens, first generation, second generation, and third generation. We use dichotomous indicators for each category, but exclude third generation. Second, we create a Patriotism Scale using two questions on the importance of being an American and how good a person feels seeing the American flag \((\alpha = .86)\).

Most of what we know about voter fraud beliefs is informed by broader attitudes about American government institutions and electoral outcomes. In predicting beliefs about voter fraud, we measure relevant social and political dispositions from the preelection module of the 2014 CCES. First, partisanship should also be a strong predictor of public opinion about electoral integrity. Voter fraud debates are largely understood in partisan and polarized terms \((\text{Bowler & Donovan, 2016; Wolak, 2014})\). Studies show that voter
fraud concerns are advanced primarily by conservatives and Republican elites (Dreier & Martin, 2010; Ellis, 2014; Hasen, 2012), while liberal groups and Democratic Party elites tend to spread fears that voting restrictions may disenfranchise some voters (Atkeson, Adams, & Alvarez, 2014; Bowler & Donovan, 2016; Hasen, 2012). In addition, most voter restrictions are either enacted or introduced by predominantly Republican-dominated state legislatures (Hicks, McKee, Sellers, & Smith, 2015). If partisans in the mass public internalize messages coming from respective party elites (Zaller, 1992), we expect that Republicans are more likely than Democrats and Independents to believe that voter fraud occurs frequently in U.S. elections. We use three dichotomous variables to delineate between Democrats, Independents, and Republicans.5

Prior studies point to other subgroups that may hold unique voter fraud beliefs. There is variation in information from different news sources on this issue, as conservative sources tend to emphasize concerns about voter fraud while liberal sources tend to focus more on voter suppression fears (Hasen, 2012; Henderson, 2015). Unlike the ANES data in Study 2, the CCES data include relatively few questions about specific sources of political information. We create a conservative news exposure index based on three questions (α = .75), two of which ask how frequently respondents watch Fox News and visit its website. Uncritical reports of voter fraud are more common on Fox News than other news sources (Dreier & Martin, 2010), including allegations of noncitizen voting (Henderson, 2015). For example, in 2017, Fox & Friends co-host Ainsley Earhardt alleged that 5.7 million noncitizens may have voted in the 2008 election (Sherman, 2017). We are not aware of other major news organizations reporting the same allegation. There is some evidence that Fox News influences public opinion, particularly support for presidential candidates (DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007; Smith, 2016). More relevant to our study, people who trust Fox News are much more likely to believe that voter fraud is a big problem than viewers of other news networks (Jones et al., 2014). Furthermore, exposure to Fox News is associated with negative views of Mexican immigrants and more support for restrictive immigration policies (Gil de Zúñiga, Correa, & Valenzuela, 2012). For these reasons, we include a measure of conservative media exposure as a control variable. We create a similar measure of exposure to liberal media based on six questions that ask how often respondents watch particular TV networks or visit certain websites (α = .82). Few people report consuming partisan news sources at least several days a week (6% for conservative sources, 5% for liberal sources). We expect that conservative media exposure is positively associated with beliefs about the frequency of voter fraud while liberal media exposure is negatively associated with voter fraud beliefs.
Along the same lines, it may be that general exposure to news influences beliefs about voter fraud, as fraud allegations tend to be regular news items, particularly as a major election approaches (Dreier & Martin, 2010; Fogarty et al., 2015). Thus, we also use five questions on type of media usage to gauge overall media consumption. Furthermore, others find that higher levels of education and political knowledge tend to reduce public concerns about election fraud (Gronke, 2014; Wolak, 2014). We include controls for both factors. Education is measured with six categories of educational attainment ranging from having no high school degree to having a postgraduate degree. Political knowledge is measured with two questions asking participants whether they know which political party controls the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate (α = .80).

Last, other scholars have noted that the issue of voter fraud has become racialized, with some political rhetoric describing voter fraud as an urban problem specifically implicating African Americans (Dreier & Martin, 2010; Ellis, 2014; Minniti, 2010; D. C. Wilson & Brewer, 2013). This rhetoric encourages the public to bring to mind racial attitudes when considering the issue of voter fraud. As a result, some have found a positive relationship between racial resentment and public beliefs about voter fraud (Appleby & Federico, 2017; D. C. Wilson & Brewer, 2013; D. C. Wilson & King-Meadows, 2016). Racial resentment seems to be a strong predictor of public support for voting restrictions as well (D. C. Wilson & Brewer, 2013). We create a Black Resentment Scale based on items in the CCES common content survey (α = .75), and expect that people with higher racial resentment tend to believe that voter fraud occurs more frequently.

We also control for age, sex, and race. We use a set of dichotomous indicators to designate respondents who identify as female, Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, Mixed, and Other. Because of a history of resisting the Voting Rights Act, we control for whether a respondent lives in the South as defined by the U.S. Census. The base category in our statistical models of voter fraud beliefs consist of respondents who identify as White, male, Republican, and third generation Americans with mean levels of political knowledge, media exposure, education, racial resentment, immigrant resentment, and who does not live in the south.

**Results**

Table A-3 in the online appendix displays the ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients and robust standard errors from the separate models of voter fraud beliefs. For comparison, we standardize all scales (i.e., immigrant resentment, nationalism, negative Latino stereotypes, ratings of undocumented
immigrants, Black resentment, and political knowledge), media consumption measures, education, and age. Our results provide strong evidence that a general measure of immigrant resentment is a robust predictor of voter fraud perceptions. In Models 1 and 2 of Table A-3, a one-standard-deviation change in Immigrant Resentment Scale is associated with a .29 increase ($SE = .04, p < .001$) in the Voter Fraud Perception Scale. The results also show a significant negative association between voter fraud perceptions and receptivity toward undocumented immigrants ($b = −.09, SE = .05, p < .05$), but not with negative stereotypes toward Latinos. The size and significance of the immigrant resentment indicator does not change after accounting for holding negative stereotypes of Latinos; however, its size does decrease by 24% after controlling for attitudes toward undocumented immigrants. The findings suggest that voter fraud perceptions tap an underlying dimension of attitudes involving undocumented immigrants, a group of immigrants that are dominantly constructed as criminals.

The effect of immigrant resentment is nearly cut in half (−45%) after adding the control for Black resentment. The results from the last model in Table A-3 (online appendix) show that the resentment scales nearly produce the same change in voter fraud perceptions. Comparing the Black resentment and immigrant resentment indicators, a one-standard-deviation change in each is associated with a .18 ($SE = .05, p < .001$) and .16 ($SE = .05, p < .001$) increase in the Voter Fraud Scale, respectively.7 Moving from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile in immigrant resentment is associated with a .43 increase in the Voter Fraud Scale, holding other factors constant. A similar change in racial resentment is associated with a .50 increase in voter fraud perceptions. These relationships are substantial given that the Voter Fraud Scale has a range of 3. We interpret our results to indicate that the dominant racial attitudinal frameworks that center on Black antipathy cannot easily wash away the effect of other dimensions of racial and ethnic animus directed at immigrants in particular.

In addition, immigrant resentment serves as a significant predictor of voter fraud perceptions above and beyond other relevant dispositions toward politics. Our models provide evidence that political sophistication matters. Even after controlling for racial and ethnic indicators in Model 4, a one-standard-deviation increase in education is associated with a decrease in voter fraud perceptions ($b = −.10, SE = .03, p < .01$). Increasing education levels from the 10th to the 90th percentile is associated with a .29 drop in voter fraud perceptions, holding other variables constant. Meanwhile, some model results show that political knowledge ($b = −.09, SE = .04, p < .05$) is significantly associated with lower voter fraud perceptions (see Models 1 and 2 in Table A-3, online appendix).
Our results also provide stronger evidence for partisan effects and the influence of conservative media outlets. As Models 1 through 3 in Table A-3 (online appendix) indicate, Democrats on average score .25 lower than Republicans in voter fraud perceptions ($SE = .09, p < .001$). That partisan coefficient does not change after controlling for attitudes toward undocumented immigrants, but becomes statistically insignificant when models account for Black resentment ($b = -.15, SE = .15$ in Model 4). In Model 1, a one-standard-deviation change in watching conservative media outlets is associated with a .32 increase on average ($SE = .05, p < .001$) in voter fraud perceptions. In contrast, a one-standard-deviation change in watching liberal media outlets is associated with a .17 drop on average in voter fraud perceptions ($SE = .04, p < .001$). These effect sizes, standard errors, and significance levels change minimally in different model specifications. Last, our results suggest that elite rhetoric on voter fraud is more impressionable on newer than older generations of voters. Compared with third-generation participants, first-generation respondents believe voter fraud occurs more frequently ($b = .24, SE = .10, p < .05$). The estimated effect of this generational difference is less certain, though, once our models account for all racial and ethnic indicators. Other demographic measures, including age, sex, race, and ethnicity are largely unrelated to public beliefs about voter fraud.

Some may wonder whether immigrant resentment is only associated with beliefs about the frequency of noncitizen voting, rather than other types of voter fraud. When we examine the individual questions that comprise the Voter Fraud Scale, we find that immigrant resentment is a strong predictor of beliefs about each type of fraudulent activity (see Table A-4 in the online appendix). We use an ordinal logit estimation to model the responses to individual voter fraud questions. We find that a one-standard-deviation increase in immigrant resentment has the strongest association with believing that noncitizen voting occurs very frequently in U.S. elections ($b = .49, SE = .14, p < .001$), and is slightly stronger than Black resentment ($b = .44, SE = .14, p < .001$). In Figure 1, we compare the relative impact of significant racial and ethnic attitudes on each item of the Voter Fraud Perception Scale. As the first two panels of Figure 1 further illustrate, immigrant resentment has a marginally larger effect than Black resentment on the probability of believing that double voting and voter impersonation are “very common” in American elections. As immigrant resentment increases from lowest to highest values, the predicted probability of believing that either form of fraud is very common increases by roughly .14 and .12, respectively. The third panel of Figure 1 indicates that the estimated impact of immigrant resentment on beliefs about noncitizen voting is even bigger, and substantially larger than the impact of racial resentment. As immigrant resentment increases from
lowest to highest values, the probability of believing that noncitizen voting is very common increases by approximately 27 percentage points. A comparable rise in Black resentment increases the probability of believing the noncitizen voting is very common by almost 17 percentage points. It is not surprising that immigrant resentment is more closely related to beliefs about the type of voter fraud directly implicating noncitizens. The results are also consistent with our main hypothesis: Even when asked about forms of voter fraud that do not necessarily involve noncitizens, people with more resentment toward immigrants are still more likely to believe that those fraudulent acts occur frequently.

We are also interested in whether voter fraud beliefs are associated with negative attitudes toward immigrants from a particular part of the world. To answer this question, we leverage a question wording experiment that we conducted in the pre-election module. All respondents were asked to use a thermometer rating to indicate how cold (0) or warm (100) they feel about Irish immigrants. Then, respondents were randomly assigned one of three group thermometer rating questions on African, Chinese, and Mexican immigrants. Measuring attitudes toward Irish immigrants creates a baseline against which to compare the effects of the other immigrant groups. We then examine the association between the different immigrant group ratings and voter fraud

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**Figure 1.** Predicted probability of believing voter fraud is very common across racial and ethnic indicators.


*Note.* Values for each indicator (represented by lines) are rescaled from 0 to 1, with positive numbers indicating more negative attitudes toward group and negative numbers indicating positive attitudes toward group. All other variables held at mean and median values. Figures based on Table A-4 in the online appendix.
beliefs while controlling for other competing explanatory variables proposed in this study. We provide the results of our regression models with immigrant group thermometer ratings as predictors in our online appendix (see Table A-11).

In Figure 2, we compare the relative impact of each thermometer scale on the Voter Fraud Perceptions Scale. We find that feelings toward Irish immigrants are unrelated to beliefs about voter fraud. In contrast, when asked about the other immigrant groups, people with colder feelings toward those groups are more inclined to think that voter fraud occurs very frequently. Our findings show that a one-standard-deviation change in warmth toward Mexican immigrants is associated with a decrease in voter fraud perceptions ($b = -0.12$, $SE = .05$, $p < .05$). Moving from extremely low to extremely positive ratings of Mexican immigrants is associated with a roughly 1 point drop in the expected Voter Fraud Scale. However, there is no statistically significant relationship between views toward Irish, African, or Chinese immigrants and beliefs about voter fraud. Additional tests of the treatment effects indicate that the Mexican immigrant treatment group had significantly higher voter fraud beliefs than the Chinese immigrant treatment group ($b = 0.19$, $SE = .09$, $p < .05$). No significant differences were found between Mexican and African immigrant groups.

Figure 2. Impact of immigrant thermometer indicators on voter fraud perceptions.
Note. Thermometer measures rescaled from 0 to 1, where the larger number indicates warmth toward group estimates based on Cooperative Congressional Election Study survey weights. Larger and positive scores on the y axis indicate beliefs that fraud occurs frequently.
or Chinese and African immigrant groups. This suggests that voter restrictions, which may depress turnout among voters of color (Hajnal, Lajevardi, & Nielson, 2017), are being mobilized by tapping into public animosity toward Mexican immigrants. Overall, the CCES study shows a strong relationship between immigrant resentment and voter fraud beliefs.

Study 2: Election Integrity Measures in the 2012 ANES

We have two main objectives in our second study. First, we build on our first study showing that voter fraud beliefs extend beyond racial animus to immigration concerns, using different measures of election fraud beliefs and immigration attitudes. Second, we aim to further show that immigrant animosity biases a person’s perception of election integrity even after controlling for many covariates, including general orientations toward the political system. When registration and voting procedures operate smoothly, the public is more likely to believe in the integrity of elections. Prior studies provide some evidence that public confidence in elections is shaped by the performance of election administrators at the state level (Bowler et al., 2015) and at the local level (Gronke, 2014; Hall, Monson, & Patterson, 2009). There is less evidence that state election laws influence public concerns about election integrity. For example, the adoption of photo ID requirements in several states does not appear to alleviate public concerns about voter fraud (Ansolabehere & Persily, 2008; Bowler et al., 2015). These findings still suggest that public confidence in election administration should improve perceptions about the frequency of voter fraud. Last, voters with higher levels of political efficacy and trust in government tend to be more sanguine about election fraud in the United States (Gronke, 2014; Uscinski & Parent, 2014; Wolak, 2014). This suggests that such dispositions should lower voter fraud beliefs.

To this end, we further test our hypotheses using the 2012 ANES data. We provide a more detailed explanation of our measures in the online appendix. We again use dependent variables that ask respondents about the frequency of election integrity outcomes. The 2012 ANES Time Series Study includes questions in the postelection wave that ask how often in our country “votes are counted fairly” and “election officials are fair.” Thus, respondents knew the outcome of the 2012 election when answering the questions. We focus on these two items as dependent variables because they come closest to the election fraud allegations that frequently appear in election reform debates in the United States. We code both variables so that higher scores indicate a stronger belief that elections are fraudulent. Less than one third of respondents
believe that votes are counted fairly “very often,” and less than one quarter believe that election officials are fair “very often.”

We examine two measures of hostility to immigrants as our primary independent variable of interest. One is an Anti-Immigration Scale based on responses to six ANES questions on immigration. Each item was recoded to a 0-1 scale, with higher values indicating greater antipathy toward immigrants, and the six variables were averaged together to form an Anti-Immigration Scale ($\alpha = .75$). We also create an Ethnocentrism Scale based on stereotype questions that ask the degree to which particular groups (Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians) are “hard working” and “intelligent.” Following the method used by Kam and Kinder (2012, p. 328), the average rating for out-group members is subtracted from the in-group rating on each trait. Then the two trait comparison measures are averaged together to create an Ethnocentrism Scale ($\alpha = .69$). Higher scores indicate greater hostility to racial and ethnic out-groups. We expect ethnocentrism and anti-immigration attitudes to be positively associated with the election integrity variables.

We also control for similar partisan and ideological predispositions that we use in the 2014 CCES analysis. Both variables are coded so that we expect them to be positively associated with the electoral integrity measures. In addition, we control for racial resentment by developing a scale with four questions that ask about the status of Blacks in American society ($\alpha = .80$).13 Higher values indicate higher levels of racial resentment, so we expect it to be positively associated with beliefs about election fraud.

We also utilize the richness of ANES surveys to control for other dispositions that we were unable to include in our CCES module. First, we control for electoral surprise, the inclination of election losers, particularly unexpected losers, to grasp at poorly sourced claims of voter fraud (Beaulieu, 2014; Wolak, 2014). To test this hypothesis, we create a dummy variable for respondents in the preelection wave of the survey who correctly predicted that President Obama would win reelection in 2012. This measure should be negatively associated with beliefs about voter fraud. Second, those with higher levels of patriotism and confidence in government should also be more confident in the fairness of elections (Wolak, 2014). We combine four questions about government corruption and waste to measure trust in government ($\alpha = .63$). Higher values indicate more trust in government. We measure patriotism with three items ($\alpha = .80$). We expect patriotism and trust to be negatively associated with beliefs about election fraud.

The ANES data include a bevy of media exposure measures as well. Many ask which newspapers, websites, and radio and television programs respondents follow regularly. We compute the average of 19 of these questions measuring exposure to conservative media sources to create a Conservative Media Consumption
Scale ($\alpha = .86$). Similarly, we combined 19 items for liberal sources into a Liberal Media Consumption Scale ($\alpha = .77$). We control for general media consumption with a separate set of questions that ask respondents how frequently they read a newspaper, watch TV news, or get news from radio shows or websites.

In addition, we include external efficacy and voter turnout as additional independent variables, since actual participation and efficacy should predict more positive assessments of election integrity. Turnout is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent reported voting in the 2012 election. We measure external efficacy by combining two items that ask respondents whether government official care about their interests and whether they have a say over what government does ($\alpha = .65$). Both variables are coded in a way that we expect them to be negatively associated with beliefs about election fraud. Fourth, we include a dummy variable for battleground states to test whether exposure to the heaviest competition in the presidential campaign produces more positive assessments of electoral fairness (Wolak, 2014). Last, we test the election administration hypothesis using data from a recent initiative that rates each state’s administration of elections based on several indicators (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016). We use the summary rating, the Election Performance Index (EPI), as a measure of state election administration in 2012. Higher scores indicate better performance, so we expect EPI to be negatively associated with our election integrity measures.

The 2012 ANES is a mixed-mode survey, with some respondents carrying out the survey via traditional face-to-face interviews and others completing the survey online. There is some indication that interviewer-administered surveys are more prone to social desirability effects, producing more positive assessments of government and elections (Atkeson et al., 2014). Internet surveys tend to generate more negative assessments and may also yield more pessimistic evaluations of electoral integrity. We include a dummy variable for the Internet mode to test this hypothesis. Finally, we include controls for political knowledge, education, income, race, and ethnicity.

Since our dependent variables are ordinal measures, we estimate an ordered logit model to examine the predictors of beliefs about electoral integrity. Each of the independent variables are scored on a 0-1 interval. For each dependent variable, we estimate one model with anti-immigration attitudes as our main predictor of interest and a second model with ethnocentrism as the chief independent variable.

**Results**

Table A-13 in the online appendix provides the results from models of election integrity ratings in the United States. Our results provide additional evidence of
a strong relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and measures of electoral fraud beliefs. Anti-immigration attitudes and ethnocentrism are potent predictors of electoral integrity beliefs, even after controlling for a host of other factors. A one-standard-deviation increase in the Anti-Immigration Scale increases the odds of negative evaluations by 22% on the “votes counted fairly” measure and by 21% on the “election officials are fair” measure. A one-standard-deviation increase in the Ethnocentrism Scale yields a somewhat weaker but statistically significant relationship with election integrity evaluations (14% and 20%, respectively). Moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile on the Anti-Immigration Scale is associated with a .10 decline in the predicted probability of believing that votes are counted fairly very often and a .08 decline in the predicted probability of believing that election officials are very often fair. A similar change in ethnocentrism is associated with a 6 percentage point drop in the “very often” response on both election integrity items. In addition, we find a stronger impact of ethnocentrism and anti-immigration attitudes on voter fraud beliefs when the sample is restricted to non-Hispanic Whites. All of these estimated impacts are statistically significant at $p < .001$. Among the other independent variables, only political knowledge and trust in government consistently produce stronger associations with beliefs about electoral integrity.

Consistent with previous studies, we find that perceptions of election integrity are influenced by broader pessimism toward government, mainstream politics, and election administration. Individuals with less patriotism and trust in government are less likely to believe that votes are counted fairly and election officials act fairly. A one-standard-deviation increase in trust in government reduces the odds of negative evaluations on the “votes counted fairly” measure by 23% and by 29% on the “election officials are fair” measure. Moving from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile on trust in government increases the predicted probability of believing that elections are fair very often by approximately 14 percentage points. A one-standard-deviation increase in patriotism reduces the odds of believing that votes are not counted fairly (20%) more than believing that election officials are not fair (9%). Increasing patriotism from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile increases the predicted probability of believing that votes are very often counted fairly by approximately 9 percentage points. These estimated effects are statistically significant at $p < .001$. Patriotism is a somewhat rare disposition that is positively associated with evaluations of election fairness but appears unrelated to beliefs about the frequency of voter fraud in the CCES study.

Other indicators of positive connections to the political system tend to produce favorable assessments of election integrity. People who did not vote in the 2012 elections and have lower levels of political efficacy are more likely to hold negative evaluations of election fairness. Voters are 6
percentage points more likely than nonvoters to believe that votes are very often counted fairly and 9 points more likely to believe that election officials are very often fair \( (p < .001) \). A one-standard-deviation increase in external efficacy reduces the odds of negative election assessments by roughly 14\% (\( p < .001 \)). Similarly, education and political knowledge are associated with more positive evaluations of election integrity. One-standard-deviation increases in political knowledge and education lower the odds of unfavorable election fairness beliefs by roughly 24\% and 16\%, respectively (\( p < .001 \)).

As in the CCES study, we again find that exposure to conservative media outlets is associated with more negative assessments of election integrity. Increasing conservative media exposure from the 10th to the 90th percentile reduces the predicted probability of believing that vote counts and election officials are very often fair by 7 percentage points and 4 percentage points, respectively (\( p < .001 \)). Liberal media exposure and overall news consumption are substantively and statistically unreliable predictors of election fairness evaluations.

The ANES results also provide evidence of a mode effect in public evaluations of election integrity. Face-to-face respondents are 8 percentage points more likely than Internet respondents to believe that votes are very often counted fairly and 5 points more likely to believe that election officials are very often fair (\( p < .001 \)). These findings are consistent with prior research suggesting that Internet surveys yield somewhat more negative assessments of political institutions and processes. The results also indicate that negative assessments of election fairness are slightly more prominent among people who live in battleground states than those living in nonbattleground states. These findings are telling, since the one objective measure of election performance (EPI) is not significantly related to beliefs about election fairness.\(^{14}\)

Leveraging the oversampling of racial minorities in the 2012 ANES, we are able to examine the election integrity ratings of non-Hispanic Blacks and Hispanics. We find that African Americans, Hispanics, and Americans of another race tend to report less positive evaluations of election fairness than White Americans (\( p < .001 \)). However, when we estimate a simplified model that interacts the immigrant resentment measures with race, we find that any effect of anti-immigration attitudes on voter fraud beliefs seems to be located primarily among non-Hispanic White respondents. In Figures 3 and 4, we plot the predicted probability of believing that fair outcomes occur “very often” across group-based attitudes segmented by race. Generally, an increase in anti-immigrant attitudes decreases the probability of holding positive evaluations of election fairness. Among individuals with lower anti-immigrant attitudes, White respondents tend to be substantially more optimistic about election integrity than Black and Hispanic respondents. Yet, an increase in anti-immigrant
attitudes has a larger effect in diminishing optimism among Whites than racial and ethnic minorities. Thus, White Americans with strong anti-immigrant attitudes tend to hold negative assessments of election integrity on par with Black and Hispanic Americans. Ethnocentrism has an even larger negative effect on the election fraud beliefs of Whites, shown in Figure 4. Figure 4 also illustrates that Blacks and Hispanics who believe that Whites are less intelligent and lazier than racial minorities are less likely to hold positive assessments of election integrity. However, as they subscribe to the stereotype of White superiority, Blacks tend to give generally more positive evaluations of elections, while Hispanics tend to believe that votes are counted fairly very often.

As with our CCES study, controlling for group-based attitudes and other political orientations seems to leave little room for partisanship and ideology to explain variation in voter fraud beliefs. Changing the coding of party identification to nominal categories, or removing ideology from the equation, does not improve partisanship’s explanatory power. Part of the reason for the weak performance of partisanship is its correlation with the sore loser measure. Those who correctly expected Obama to be reelected in 2012 were approximately 6 percentage points more likely than other respondents to believe that ballot counts and election officials are very often fair ($p < .001$). However, our evidence also suggests that group-based attitudes toward

**Figure 3.** Election integrity evaluations across anti-immigration attitudes by race. *Source.* 2012 American National Election Study. *Note.* Anti-immigration attitudes are rescaled using values from 0 to 1. Larger values indicate more anti-immigration attitudes.
immigrants account for some of the partisan differences in public beliefs about election integrity.

Meanwhile, after controlling for immigration attitudes, we fail to find evidence that racial resentment is associated with beliefs about election integrity. It appears that broader indicators of out-group hostility (i.e., ethnocentrism) more reliably predict electoral integrity evaluations than the more narrowly tailored racial resentment measure. In comparing our two studies, we find that anti-immigrant attitudes are strongly associated with beliefs about voter fraud and election fairness, but racial resentment only helps explain voter fraud beliefs. This disparity in our findings may be due to the nature of voter fraud rhetoric in the United States. While there are examples noted above of rhetoric framing voter fraud as an urban problem, these examples tend to focus on voter registration, and the language tends to stop short of implicating election officials and the fairness of the vote count. In contrast, voter fraud rhetoric targeting immigrants tends to include claims that noncitizens change the vote count and swing election outcomes, as in the statements by President Trump and Rep. Broun noted above, thus “diluting” the votes of American citizens (e.g., von Spakovsky, 2008). Overall, the language of voting integrity may be “immigration-aliased” (Garand et al., 2015) more than it is racialized. In any case, this puzzle deserves attention in future research.

Figure 4. Election integrity evaluations across ethnocentrism by race.
Note. Ethnocentrism values recoded to range from 0 to 1. Larger numbers indicate higher ethnocentrism.
Conclusion

Across two studies, we present strong evidence that group-centric attitudes toward immigrants are associated with public beliefs about voter fraud. Using data from the 2014 CCES, we show that immigrant resentment is a strong predictor of voter fraud beliefs. Using the 2012 ANES data, we find that the effects of anti-immigration and ethnocentric attitudes remain robust across different measures of election fairness. Both studies indicate immigration concerns are associated with election integrity beliefs above and beyond the impact of traditional political dispositions involving party, ideology, election administration, and racial animus.

We believe these findings are due to two contemporary conditions in American politics. First, the foreign-born population has increased sharply in recent years, particularly in historically newer American destinations. This makes immigration a more salient consideration for many Americans when thinking about politics. Second, political rhetoric often paints immigrants as lawbreakers, particularly in the voting domain, thus priming attitudes toward immigrants when people think about criminal behavior. While we test these ideas in the United States, we believe that immigration attitudes may shape voter fraud beliefs in other countries where politics are roiled by immigration anxieties.

The results of our studies are consistent with studies that show that racial animus structures voter fraud beliefs (Appleby & Federico, 2017; D. C. Wilson & Brewer, 2013). Yet, our findings from the CCES also suggest that such conclusions about racial attitudes are incomplete. In response to calls to use attitudes toward immigrants as explanatory variables (e.g., Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014), we find that immigrant resentment is a robust predictor of voter fraud beliefs. In addition, this relationship is mediated in part by attitudes toward undocumented immigrants and Mexican immigrants. We argue that these findings are largely attributed to the Immigrant Resentment Scale capturing various attitudes on whether immigrants increase crime, disrupt social and political norms, are undeserving American members, and decrease the political influence of White Americans. These attitudes are not measured in other Racial Attitude Scales, but are likely called to mind when respondents are asked about how often people commit voter fraud.

Our findings suggest that immigrant resentment is a strong and reliable predictor of other attitudes concerning American political membership. While immigrant anxiety increases trust in certain political actors, primarily Republican leaders (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015), we find that immigrant resentment is associated with lower levels of trust in the integrity of American elections. We also find significant relationships between measures of
conservative media exposure and beliefs that voter fraud occurs frequently. Overall, these findings suggest that elite rhetoric might provoke Americans’ pessimistic beliefs about election fraud.

We are aware that two cross-sectional surveys are not ideal for making causal inferences and do not provide the last word on this topic. Nevertheless, this study establishes a clear relationship between immigrant resentment and beliefs about voting integrity that merits further examination. In particular, we suggest survey experiments that test the impact of elite messages linking immigration and voter fraud. Furthermore, we examine public opinion measures that focus on estimates of the frequency of fraudulent and fair election activities. Additional research should examine the relationship between immigrant resentment and other dimensions of voter fraud beliefs (such as voter confidence, the significance of fraudulent acts, and misbehavior by other actors in the election process). The gap in political science scholarship on voter fraud beliefs is due in part to a dearth of survey instruments that include questions about perceptions of voter fraud and attitudes toward immigrants all in the same survey. As such, prior studies produced indirect analyses by using less reliable and valid demographic indicators of Latino or foreign-born population growth as approximations of the threat or animosity that native-born feel toward immigrants.

Hostility toward immigrants is a reliable predictor of concerns about voter fraud and thus a likely source of public support for restrictive laws such as photo ID and proof of citizenship requirements for voters. Voter fraud perceptions are associated with public support for restrictive voter identification laws (D. C. Wilson & Brewer, 2013). Relatedly, states with a higher share of minority residents or voters are more likely to introduce legislation with restrictive voting policies, like photo ID requirements (Bentele & O’Brien, 2013; Hicks et al., 2015). The policymaking process may be shaped by political rhetoric that frequently links immigration, race, and voter fraud, sometimes in a hyperbolic manner. Furthermore, debates about proposed voting restrictions often focus on the anticipated impact of those policies on minority groups. Thus, in a “group-centric” polity, we expect that public support for proposed voting restrictions will be associated with attitudes toward immigrants.

In sum, the role of animosity toward racial and ethnic minorities is underappreciated in scholarship on public opinion about election fraud and voting reforms. Much of the existing literature emphasizes partisan and ideological divisions among the electorate on photo ID laws, for example, largely reflecting clear partisan divisions among elites on these issues. The partisan and ideological differences are real, but photo ID and proof of citizenship requirements enjoy majority support among people of all political stripes in the
United States. Widespread support for these policies, and heightened concerns about voter fraud, appear to be nourished by a reservoir of hostility toward racial and ethnic minorities. Animosity toward immigrants may solidify public support for measures to restrict participation of eligible voters in democratic elections. This is troubling, given that legislators and courts lean heavily on public concerns about voter fraud as justification for new election laws. These prejudices may extend to election officials themselves. A recent study (White, Nathan, & Faller, 2015) finds that Latino voters receive less assistance from local election officials than White voters. In any case, the topic of fraudulent voting practices will likely continue to provoke voters to call to mind groups that are politically constructed as “un-American.”

Authors’ Note

Earlier versions of this manuscript were presented at the 2015 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, Illinois, the 2015 Cooperative Congressional Election Study Conference in Provo, Utah, and provided on the Monkey Cage Politics Blog of the Washington Post.

Acknowledgments

We are grateful for the helpful feedback from Stephen Ansolabehere, Brian Schaffner, Jonathan Ladd, Philip Paolino, John Sides, Paul Gronke, Michael Cobb and our anonymous reviewers for the manuscript. We also thank Sam Luks, Marissa Shih, Liz Salazar, and YouGov for their support and expertise in administering our survey.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: We acknowledge the support of the University of Missouri Research Board, the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Missouri–St. Louis, and National Science Foundation Award 1430505.

Supplementary Material

Supplementary material is available for this article online.

Notes

1. One study concludes that approximately 2% to 6% of noncitizens vote illegally in American elections (Richman, Chattha, & Earnest, 2014). However, this study
has major flaws. The estimate is based on a sample survey yet does not report confidence intervals for any estimates of illegal voting. More importantly, large sample surveys are inferior for making inferences about low probability events when there are even small amounts of measurement error in key variables (in this case, there is some error in the question identifying noncitizens). Another study of the same data concludes that the noncitizen voting rate in the United States is likely 0 (Ansolabehere, Luks, & Schaffner, 2015).

2. These states are South Carolina, Alabama, Tennessee, Delaware, Arkansas, South Dakota, Nevada, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, Wyoming, Idaho, Indiana, and Mississippi.

3. A recent review of criminology research finds that immigration generally has not increased crime rates in the United States (Ousey & Kubrin, 2017).

4. Bowler and Donovan (2016) use the same three items to construct a Voter Fraud Scale.

5. Due to much of the voter fraud and election integrity rhetoric expressed in polarized terms (Wolak, 2014), we anticipate that partisan cues will have minimal effect on independents and those who are unsure of their party identification. To this end, we group these two groups of respondents (163 and 46, respectively) together to avoid dropping more observations when analyzing the dependent variable, which is measured in the postelection wave.

6. While 1,000 respondents participated in our preelection module, 873 respondents participated in our postelection module. Since we measure voter fraud perceptions in the postelection module, the most observations that we could have in a statistical model is 873. Additional missing observations arise from participants who did not answer questions on watching Fox News (16), the political knowledge battery (1), immigrant resentment battery (1), and voter fraud battery (2). The number of observations in Models 3 and 4 of Table A-3 (online appendix) is lower, due to 116 participants preferring not to answer the undocumented immigrant thermometer question. We also tested models that include household income as a predictor. Ultimately, we left income out of the reported results because over 100 respondents did not answer the income question. Income is not a statistically significant predictor of voter fraud beliefs in the CCES study, and the substantive findings do not change when income is included in the model. These results are available from the authors.

7. Black resentment and immigrant resentment are positively related measures ($r = .6$), but they are conceptually distinct. Immigrants comprise less than 10% of Black Americans (Anderson, 2015), so immigrant resentment is largely directed at a different group than racial resentment. Given the prior research findings on racial resentment noted above, it is important to control for racial resentment when examining the association between attitudes toward immigrants and voter fraud beliefs. If we remove Black resentment from the analysis, then the coefficients for immigrant resentment and partisanship increase in size (see Tables A-5 and A-13 in the online appendix).

8. Other statistical models in the online appendix (Tables A-9 and A-10) indicate that Black resentment has similar effects for Republicans, Independents, and
Democrats. Models interacting Black resentment with race also suggest that Black resentment has a larger effect on Whites than Hispanic \( (b = -0.87, SE = 0.50, p < 0.10) \), Asian \( (b = -0.87, SE = 0.72, p < 0.10) \), or mixed race \( (b = -0.84, SE = 0.49, p < 0.05) \) identifiers.

9. Conservative media exposure is positively associated with immigrant resentment \( (r = 0.33) \), racial resentment \( (r = 0.32) \), and Republican partisanship \( (r = 0.29) \), and negatively correlated with liberal media exposure \( (r = 0.28) \). If we remove the conservative and liberal media variables from Model 4, then the coefficients for immigrant resentment, racial resentment, partisanship, and general news consumption increase in size (see Table A-7 in the online appendix).

10. For each figure, we recode the independent variables on a 0-1 scale so that different variables have comparable minimum and maximum values.

11. The predicted probabilities reported in the text are “as observed”—calculated while leaving other independent variables at observed values and then averaging over all cases in the sample (see Hanmer & Kalkan, 2013).

12. These tests have weaker statistical power since a different subsample evaluated each non-Irish immigrant group.

13. Racial resentment is positively correlated with ethnocentrism \( (r = 0.35) \) and the Anti-Immigration Scale \( (r = 0.46) \). Removing racial resentment from the models does not appreciably change the coefficient estimates for the other independent variables (compare Tables A-13 and A-14 in the online appendix).

14. When we control for other state performance measures, such as the frequency of registration and absentee voting problems, we also find little to no relationship with public beliefs about election integrity.

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**Author Biographies**

**Adriano Udani** is an assistant professor of Political Science at the University of Missouri – St. Louis with a joint appointment in the Public Policy Administration Program. He studies the proximity and visibility of immigration and immigrant policies in the lives of U.S. citizens.

**David Kimball** is a professor and director of graduate studies in Political Science at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. His research interests include voting behavior, election administration, public opinion, and interest group lobbying.