From Larry Scanlon, “Sweet
Persuasion: The Subject of Fortune in Troilus
and Criseyde,” in Chaucer’s Trolius and Criseyde: ‘Subgit to alle Poesye’: Essays in Criticism,
ed. R.A. Shoaf (Binghamton, 1992)
The Middle Ages
clearly understood and valued Fortune’s figural complexity. As Derek Pearsall astutely observes:
The paradox of Boethius’s influence upon the Middle Ages. . .is that the illusions of Fortune’s power that
Philosophy so
authoritatively dispels proved more potent and resilient as images than the rational
arguments demonstrating their
non-existence. Medieval literature is full of portraits of the awesome goddess
Fortuna, and particularly fond of
demonstrations of the remorseless and arbitrary power of her Wheel.
For a later medieval culture, there is
no better illustration of the image’s potency than Boccaccio’s De casibus,
which uses Fortune as the central organizing principle in an encyclopedic
exploration of the falls of illustrious men from Adam to contemporary
princes. Often mistakenly assigned to
the tradition of the De contempt mundi,
the work is in act much more closely related to the Fürstenspeigel, the Mirror of
Princes. (215)
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Nevertheless,
to understand fully the political charge Fortune held for medieval court
audiences, it is necessary to return to the Consolatio and
examine the dramatic circumstances in which its sweet persuasion is offered. As
a senator condemned for treason, deprived of his property and imprisoned, what
Boethius faces is expulsion from the ruling class. If this dilemma affects him most directly, it
also implicates the ruling class as a whole. For it presents the possibility
that the hegemonic power in which each member has some share can suddenly and
unpredictably turn against him. The Consolatio’s dramatic
situation marks the ideological limit of the internal unity of the
ruling class. Fortune figures that limit, and figures it in such a way as to
reduce its threat. For
although the image of Fortune and her wheel speaks to the contingency of
material power, it understands such contingency as absolutely
random, and denies it any coherent historical specificity. It
assumes an invariable baseline against which increases or losses are measured,
an immutable status quo, which in application will turn out to be the
existing class structure. . . .
The
status quo which underwrites Fortune's game also underwrites
Philosophy's Stoic antidote, the internal self-possession which enables one to
see through Fortune's illusions. For if we ask what exactly is possessed in
this state of self-possession, we will see it can be nothing other than the
equilibrium that exists in the moment before Fortune's game begins--in other
words, one's social position. To suggest that some element of one's social
position is innate, self-possessed, is simply to ratify the bias already built
into any society ruled by an aristocracy of birth. In the figure of Fortune an
aristocratic class can at once recognize the flux of historical existence, and
affirm its own privilege as a locus of stability beyond such flux.
Furthermore,
the recognition enables the aristocracy to evade its own role in producing that
flux. Great men who fell from the top of Fortune's wheel were usually given a
good push by would-be great men below them. Fortune completely deflects such
intra-class conflict, whose motivations are clearly identifiable and highly
specific, onto to its own random, indefinite figural space. It establishes a
rhetorical common ground to which the ruling class can appeal even at that
moment when it is most divided. Thus Paulus can weep for Perses
at the very moment he captures him. Here is the subtlety, at once rhetorical
and ideological, which Fortune's ostensible simplicity conceals. As a figure,
Fortune seems entirely threadbare. It consists of nothing more than a
perfunctory indication of gender and the single image of the wheel, whose sole
function is to register, in an abstract and completely dehistoricized
fashion, the variability of political power. Yet that is precisely the point.
The figure designates a specific interest at work in the process of history and
simultaneously denies its specificity. It allows history to be understood at
once as receptive to sentient action,and
as entirely given. It serves perfectly the ideological needs of an aristocratic
ruling class, which must continually struggle to maintain its privilege, but
wishes also to understand that privilege as a given. (216-17)
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In "Sweet Persuasion," Scanlon
argues that Fortune was wildly popular with medieval aristocrats because she
displaced the arbitrariness and cruel competitiveness of courtly culture. Private ambitions and vicious rivalries
regroup under the universalizing sign of Fortune's wheel . . . . .Fortune's
universal arbitrariness screens the class-specific destructivity of the
aristocracy.
(L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, Sacrifice
Your Love: Psychoanalysis, Historicism, Chaucer [Minneapolis, 2003]: 129)